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LIBERTY OR LICENTIOUSNESS:
DISINSENTING, DISPARAGING, AND
SCANDALOUS MARKS POST-TAM AND
BRUNETTI
by LLEWELLYN JOSEPH GIBBONS1
Sorry if we try too hard
To take some power back for ours
The language of oppression
Will lose to education
Until the words can’t hurt us again2

1
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valuable comments and suggestions as well as the thoughts informally shared at the 5th Annual
Texas A&M IP Scholars Roundtable. I would also like to thank Professor Yvette Joy
Liebesman for her follow up comments on an early draft of this article. This article was
supported in part by a University of Toledo College of Law Summer Research Grant. Finally,
a special thank you to Professor Bruce Kennedy who patiently listened to the author’s
explorations of equity and history, and Professor Rick Goheen for his assistance in finding
obscure materials. As always, the author acknowledges that any value in this article is
attributed to the useful comments and prior scholarship of others, and the errors are solely his.
2 Simon Tam, #ActToChange: Working to Fight Bullying and Oppression, From the Heart,
THESLANTS.COM (Dec. 8, 2016), http://www.theslants.com/acttochange-working-to-fightbullying-and-oppression/.
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INTRODUCTION
The most significant change to the principle and supplemental trademark
registers after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Matal v. Tam (and most
recently Iancu v. Brunetti) is that the USPTO should be required to give an
“NSFW” or a trigger warning before allowing users to conduct trademark
research.3 The trademark registers are filling quickly with banal salacious
vulgarities gaudy with indecency; ripe with gender, ethnic, and racial
invective; and entirely lacking wit, charm, innuendo, or puerile humor that
characterized earlier marks.4 But alas, there is no accounting for bad taste.
The U.S. Supreme Court could be blamed for holding that the
disparaging clause of § 2(a) of the Lanham Act was an unconstitutional
violation of the First Amendment5 or for extending Tam’s holding in Brunetti
to strike down the § 2(a)’s immoral or scandalous prohibition on federal
trademark registration clause.6
Or Congress could be blamed for artless statutory drafting and recklessly
creating a vacuous legislative history that provided the courts no sound
jurisprudential reason to decide these issues differently, especially
3

Daviddv0601,
NSFW,
UrbanDictionary
(2017),
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=NSFW.
4 TRADEMARK
ELECTRONIC
SEARCH
SYSTEM
(TESS),
USPTO.GOV,
https://www.uspto.gov/trademark (last visited Feb. 27, 2020) (For example, there are 522
permutations on the word “FUCK,” 26 permutations on the word “NIGGER,” 863
permutations on the word “SHIT,” 61 permutations for the word “PISS,” 43 permutations on
the word “ASSHOLE,” 10 permutations of the word “MOTHERFUCKER,” 6 permutations
on the word “CUNT,” and 3 permutations on the word “COCKSUCKER.” In this context,
permutation means any combination of the profane term and it also includes applications that
are both “live” and “dead”); See Vicenç Feliú, The F Word - An Early Empirical Study of
Trademark Registration of Scandalous and Immoral Marks in the Aftermath of the In Re
Brunetti Decision, 18 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 404, 419-20 (2019) (explaining that
there was no rush post-Tam and Brunetti to register profane terms); See generally Anne
Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks that May be Scandalous or
Immoral, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1476 (2011) (salacious marks of an earlier more innocent era
included BUBBY TRAP [for brassieres], ACAPULOCO GOLD [for suntan lotion], OLD
GLORY [for condoms], BASTARD, DAMN, EFFIN [a euphemism for “fucking”], the
middle finger, acronyms such as WTF [for “what’s the fuck”]); See also Stacy L. Wu and
Seth I. Appel, The Evolving Landscape of Disparaging and Scandalous Trademarks,
published
in
Landslide,
Vol.
11,
No.
6,
(2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/201819/july-august/evolving-landscape-disparaging-scandalous-trademarks/ (last visited Nov. 11,
2020) (describing the registration of disparaging or scandalous marks as a “land grab” by
lesser-known entrepreneurs).
5 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017).
6 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019).
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considering compelling First Amendment policies that disfavor government
regulation of speech.7 Perhaps, the best result would be to share the credit
equally for the current mishigas.
Better yet, the blame-slate could be wiped clean, and the analytical focus
shifted from allocating blame to searching for a solution. There are at least
three possible solutions. First, the courts and the United States Patent Office
(“USPTO”) could strictly apply existing viewpoint-neutral trademark
registration principles when examining scandalous or disparaging marks and
find that often they are not serving a trademark signaling function. Second,
Congress could accept the Supreme Court’s implicit invitation in Brunetti
and enact a constitutional limitation on trademark registration prohibiting
registering scandalous marks. Finally, the best option could be for the courts
to look to their inherent powers in equity jurisdiction when crafting a remedy
to constrain incentives to encourage the registration of the most vulgar and
offensive of marks.
Courts have experience balancing the individualized needs of speakers
and the speaker’s preferred choice of expression—obviously, for example,
in the cases of obscene or pornographic speech. Courts have determined
whether speech serves a trademark function expressing source, origin, or
sponsorship or merely an ornithological use, generic or other use without
secondary meaning. And, like obscenity, the courts know fighting words
when they see or hear them. In the context of broadcast television, the courts
know which profane terms constitute a nuisance—or at least ones that are
temporally regulatable by the FCC. The marks that preoccupy this article
are not puerile or merely salacious—those that give offense but do not cause
injury. Instead, the marks that this article focuses on are those on the
spectrum from hate-speech to fighting words. This article limits itself to the
consideration of marks that constitute fighting words or similar terms that
are already regulated consistent with the First Amendment, such as the Nword, C-word, F-word, or equivalent designations defamatory or profane as
well as scandalous.8 These words are outside the mainstream of
communication and contribute infinitesimally to discourse.9 Enforcing these
designations as trademarks (incentivizing them) under principles of equity
would add little societal value. At the same time, correspondingly, there may
7

See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2017); see also Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons,
Semiotics of the Scandalous and Immoral and the Disparaging: Section 2(a) Trademark Law
After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 233 (2005).
8 In this context, the F-word is faggot, a derogatory term often used towards gay men but may
be used towards other members of the LGBQT+ communities.
9 See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2303 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in part); (Roberts,
C.J., concurring and dissenting), at 2304; (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting).

Summer 2021

LIBERTY OR LICENTIOUSNESS

87

be significant societal damage if these terms are presented to the public more
frequently.10 This article will use the term “profane” in a manner analogous
to the FCC definition to describe the types of offensive marks with which
this article is concerned. Moreover, in this article, to be a profane or indecent
(scandalous) mark, the offensiveness must be “in the mode of
communication rather than the [expressed] idea.”11
Concededly, there is no bright line that separates profane marks that are
the semiotic equivalent of fighting words from marks that are merely
common vulgarity. Also, a significant part of analyzing speech, both in
terms of law and meaning, involves identifying the speaker and context in
which the communication is made and the audience.12 This process requires
nuance in adjudication. For example, using the N-word by an individual or
member of a group stigmatized by the term may depending on use and
context and add value to the social discourse.13 There is a transformative
value-added to the discourse regardless of the government’s approval or
disapproval of the message.14 For the purposes of this article, a
transformative use of a profane make is a trademark use that adds “adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning or message…” In contrast, when used by an
individual or group merely to degrade or insult others, the N-word merely
conveys animus without adding new value or meaning to the term in the
context of the proffered discourse.15 The pejorative remains untransformed,
carrying only a derogative emotive weight. In this analytical context, the
speaker and context analysis are analogous to the transformational use
analysis of a work under copyright law, which is more highly valued and

10

See F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 98 S. Ct. 3026, 3028 (1978).
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2310 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part).
12 Cf. Synder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454-455 (2011).
13See
Keith Allan, Contextual determinants on the meaning of the N
word, SPRINGERPLUs 5, 1141 (2016) (discussing three types of uses of the N-word),
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40064-016-2813-1; RANDALL KENNEDY, NIGGER, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF A TROUBLESOME WORD 30 (Random House 2008); Cf. Meaghan Annett, When
Trademark Law Met Constitutional Law: How A Commercial Speech Theory Can Save The
Lanham Act, 61 B.C. L. REV. 253, 267-268 (2020).
14 Author’s Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d. 87, 96 (4th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted)
“[A] transformative work is one that serves a new and different function from the original
work and is not a substitute for it.”; Id. (citations omitted). The transformative use analysis is
well developed in copyright law and could readily by incorporated by analogy into trademark
law.
15See generally Shanye E. Jones & Gregory S. Parks, “Nigger”: A Critical Race Realist
Analysis of the N-Word Within Hate Crimes Law, CRIMINOLOGY F AC. PUBL’N. Paper 1,
(2013), http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cjp_facpub/1.
11See
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protected more than a mere mindless unoriginal reproduction of the
copyrighted work.16
This article contends that the courts are in the best position to delicately
weigh competing interests at the equitable remedy stage when crafting an
appropriate level of relief among speakers, commercial competitors, and
involuntary listeners. The USPTO often made pre-Tam, an implicit
determination of societal value in an ex parte administrative proceeding
without a fully developed record.17 On rare occasions, when parties litigated
profane marks before an Article III court, the adjudication was part of a
trademark registration cancellation proceeding. The claims presented a court
with a false dichotomy: maintain the registration or cancel the registration.
However, logically, there is a third choice. Register the mark but craft a
limited equitable remedy that accommodates congressionally stated public
policies and the public’s interest in using the mark—especially First
Amendment rights in the mark as a form of commercial speech.
Courts that enforce federal trademarks do so subject to the principles of
equity, and equity also provides a solution. 18 Courts have a long history of
balancing the rights of speakers and audiences. At the remedy stage, this
article does not challenge whether the First Amendment protects these
marks. They are. It does not question whether, when used as part of truthful
speech or otherwise legal speech, the speaker is fully protected by the First
Amendment for the use of pernicious marks. The speaker is. Instead, this
article raises a much different question. Whether courts must provide an
expansive remedy, especially in equity, for trademark infringement for
pernicious trademark-speech has been a hotly contested question, Tam and
Brunetti now move the battle over the role of equity from protecting
pornographic, copyrighted speech to the protection of harmful, pornographic
marks (a form of commercial expression). Inherent in this issue is whether
the right to register a mark guarantees a right of access to all available
statutory remedies at their broadest scope for its infringement. If not, under
what circumstances and under what limits should a court grant an equitable
remedy to stop the infringement of a profane mark?
16Cf.

Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2225 (1985).
In re Brunetti, 2014 WL 3976439, at 5 (TTAB Aug. 1, 2014) (“Finally, we readily
recognize the statutory limitations of this tribunal. It is abundantly clear that the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board is not the appropriate forum for re-evaluating the impacts of any
evolving First Amendment jurisprudence within Article III courts upon determinations under
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, or for answering the Constitutional arguments of legal
commentators or blog critics.”).
18 See United States Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2302
(2020).
17See
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Equity may not enjoin the registration of disparaging, scandalous, or
immoral marks.19 Still, equity may return the available remedies to the
status-quo-ante when pre-Tam and pre-Brunetti trademark law would not
help the commercial legitimization of an offensive designation through
dominant social or commercial institutions coupled with the government’s
scarlet ® imprimatur through the federal registration of trademarks that were
detrimental to society.20 Federal courts should not provide an unnecessary
de-facto subsidy for profane offensive injurious speech through the rigorous
enforcement or protection of these marks in equity. Federal trademark
protection constitutes a subsidy to commercial speech.21 The right to free
speech and property rights in a trademark does not entitle the speaker to
maximum commercial speech subsidy provided by trademark law. The
removal or narrowing of an equitable remedy will disincentivize trademark
speech that serves no societal purpose. At least elementary microeconomic
theory teaches that this should result in fewer profane marks.22 At first blush,
this may seem repugnant to the First Amendment or the principle that there
must be a potent remedy for each right’s infringement.23 However, “[t]he
grant of jurisdiction to ensure compliance with a statute hardly suggests an
19

See infra Section V.
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1759 (2017) (dismissing the significance of the ® signifier
as a federal imprimatur in the minds of the public). But see Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294,
2305 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (The Court relied on two cases where judges
simply assert public ignorance, disinterest, or uninterest in the significance of the ® without
any citation to the factual record, legislative history, any other source, including formally
taking judicial notice. The trademark registration symbol must serve some purpose to the
consumer as well as to competitors even if all the consumer understands that economically
significant companies are entitled to use the ® symbol through a process of consumer osmosis
from persistent market exposure); Copelands’ Enterprises, Inc. v. CNV, Inc., 945 F.2d 1563,
1566 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining that courts have considered the unauthorized use of the ®
in claims for the cancellation of a mark); Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. v. Hokie
Real Estate, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 2d 745, 757 (W.D. Va. 2011) (false advertising); PepsiCo, Inc.
v. Reyes, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding “failure to use the
proper trademark registration symbols, also are material and demonstrate that there is a
likelihood of confusion and deception concerning the nature and origin of the goods.”); See
also §19:146. Misuse of Statutory Notice, 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION §19:146 (5th ed.); Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105, 1110
(9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that one of the elements in a false advertising case is “the deception
is material, in that it is likely to influence the purchasing decision.”).
21 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1761 (2017); See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294,
2297-2298 (2019).
22Cf. Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 863 n.80 (5th Cir.
1979).
23 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803); Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young, 138 F.2d 972,
974 (7th Cir. 1943); See also “Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium” BLACK’s Law Dictionary, (11th ed.
2019).
20
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absolute duty to do so under any and all circumstances, and a federal judge
sitting as chancellor [in equity] is not mechanically obligated to grant an
injunction for every violation of law.”24
Part I considers whether infringing these profane marks cause an injury
worthy of addressing. Part II evaluates whether Congress could enact a
constitutionally firm trademark regime that would disincentivize profane
mark registration. This section concludes that while revising the Lanham
Trademark Act is possible, Congress is unlikely to do so. This article will
then analyze one remaining realistic option for courts to use equitable
limitations on enforcement and remedies to provide a disincentive to the
registration of profane marks. To develop the thesis that the existing
doctrines of equity may be used to discourage the registration and
commercial development of the most extreme disparaging, immoral, or
scandalous (“profane”) marks by creating an equitable disincentive, Part III
of this article will review the moral and equitable development of other forms
of intellectual property law. Part IV will analyze the enforcement of
trademarks in equity. Part V will consider the equitable enforcement of
profane trademarks post-Tam and Brunetti. This article will conclude that
using existing limitations on equitable remedies presents a possible robust
solution to discourage registration of profane marks by legitimate
businesses. Accordingly, the solution of denying an equitable remedy or
crafting the narrowest of remedies is simple, elegant, and consistent with
First Amendment values. Nevertheless, limiting equitable remedies will
provide little to no deterrence for marks (or products) that exist on the
margins of the law or for whom the mark’s purpose is to offend,
communicate, or challenge societal norms.

I. THE NUANCE NUISANCE OF AN OFFENSIVE MARK; NAMES CAN
HURT
Unfortunately, social science literature suggests that profane marks
incorporate stereotypes that are more than merely a social faux pas offensive
only to so-called “snowflakes.” Instead, these stereotypes also reinforce
implicit and explicit bias engendering cognizable individual and societal
harm.25 The social science literature suggests, and courts have long held that

24 Weinberger

v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982).
Florian Arendt & Temple Northup, Effects of Long-Term Exposure to News Stereotypes
on Implicit and Explicit Attitudes, 9 INT’L J. OF COMM. 2370 (2015),
https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/2691/1325; See generally Richard Delgado,
Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV.
25 See
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these terms cause psychological and social damage.26 The American
Psychological Association (APA) resolved that “the continued use of
American Indian mascots, symbols, images, and personalities establishes an
unwelcome and often times hostile learning environment for American
Indian students that affirms negative images/stereotypes that are promoted
in mainstream society.”27 The APA further resolved that “the continued use
of American Indian mascots, symbols, images, and personalities by school
systems appears to have a negative impact on the self-esteem of American
Indian children.”28 These stereotypes are harmful not only because they are
disparaging but also because they remind the referenced group of “the
limited ways others see them and, in this way, constrain how they can see
themselves.”29 Stereotypes are associated with lower self-esteem, decreased
aspirations, lower performance levels on tests, and problematic interpersonal
relations.30
The response by non-minority groups to these daily slights, injuries, and
other forms of microaggression suffered by others is often “don’t be a
snowflake.” However, the advice is only honored so long as their affinity
group is not targeted with commercial invective.31 Children learn a wise but
C. R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Robert T. Carter, Racism and Psychological and Emotional
Injury: Recognizing and Assessing Race-Based Traumatic Stress, 35 THE COUNSELING
PSYCHOLOGIST 13 (2007) available at https://tinyurl.com/y5hna7ce; J.V. Sanchez-Hucles,
Racism: Emotional Abusiveness and Psychological Trauma for Ethnic Minorities, 1 J. OF
EMOTIONAL ABUSE 69 (1988).
26 Cf. Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 692 & n. 11 (1954) (citing psychological studies);
but see, Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 361-361 (1987 ) (“Our misgivings about allowing
judicial decisions to turn on social science evidence are prompted, in large part, by social
science's inability to prove or disprove such propositions. If the proposed cultural meaning
test required the courts to rely upon social scientists to conclusively demonstrate causal
relationships between challenged governmental actions and harm to blacks, it would be
subject to similar criticism concerning the inadequacy of social science methodology.”).
27 APA Resolution Recommending the Immediate Retirement of American Indian Mascots,
Symbols, Images, and Personalities by Schools, Colleges, Universities, Athletic Teams, and
Organizations,
AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION,
https://www.apa.org/about/policy/mascots.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2020).
28 APA Resolution Recommending the Immediate Retirement of American Indian Mascots,
Symbols, Images, and Personalities by Schools, Colleges, Universities, Athletic Teams, and
Organizations, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (last visited Oct 16, 2020),
https://www.apa.org/about/policy/mascots.pdf.
29 Stephanie A. Fryberg, Of Warrior Chiefs and Indian Princesses: The Psychological
Consequences of American Indian Mascots, 30 BASIC AND APPLIED P SYCHOLOGY 208, 215216 & 218 (2008), http://www.indianmascots.com/fryberg--web-psychological_.pdf.
30Id. at 209 (citing studies).
31 Frieda Powers, Thin-skinned NY Post editor complains to university that a professor called
him
‘calamari’,
BIZPAC
REVIEW,
(Jan
11,
2020),

92

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 12:2

incomplete nursery rhyme that “sticks and stones can break your bones, but
names will never hurt you.” This is true unless the name is a profane mark.32
Trademark law recognizes that sticks and stones can “break” a mark or
brand.33 Tort law recognizes that names can hurt you.34 Equal rights laws
recognize that group-identity brands hurt individual rights and opportunities.
Stereotypes are the functional branding of aspects of individual identity. Like
brands, these stereotypes convey substantial economic advantages or impose
significant costs individuals associated with the stereotype.35
Stereotypes, like trademarks, “assist” the consumer because “(1) they
encourage the production of quality products; and (2) they reduce the
customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions.”36 In the
case of stereotypes, there are trademark-analogous functions, for example,
(1) the model minority myth or the obligation to be a credit to one’s race
(positive brand development), and (2) relying on social reputation (or
personal interactions with one member of the group) to generalize to the
entire group to avoid the costs of obtaining information and making an
individualized decision. This abuse of stereotypes is analogous to having an
experience with one brand named product and generalizing that other
products by the company are either good or bad rather than making
individual decisions as to each product based on facts. Unfortunately, groupidentity-brands can only serve these quality assurance functions poorly; they
do not perform this pseudo-proxy for information. Stereotypes almost
https://www.bizpacreview.com/2020/01/11/thin-skinned-ny-post-editor-complains-touniversity-that-a-professor-called-him-calamari-874588.
32 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sticks_and_Stones. The context of this article the dual
meanings of the word brand and branding are often a tragically bad pun; See Oxford
Languages Dictionary, definition of brand, https://tinyurl.com/yxnav55e (“a type of product
manufactured by a particular company under a particular name” and “an identifying mark
burned on livestock or (formerly) criminals or slaves with a branding iron.”). In the context
of a product, it is a source identifier, and, in the context of the human, the commercial brand
trademark can be an inerasable mark on the psyche of the individual and the modern
equivalent of a scarlet letter in social interactions and economic opportunity.
33 Mark A. Lemley, Fame, Parody, And Policing In Trademark Law, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1, 9 (2019) (“On the flip side, a number of courts have found the strength of the mark
decreased due to the presence of a number of other, similar marks, and the mark thus entitled
to only a narrow scope of protection.”).
34 See Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1466 (9th Cir. 1994) (“while simple
insults do not constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress, insults which include
sexual or racial harassment may rise to that level”); but see Herra v. Lufkin Indust., Inc., 474
F.3d 675, 688 (10th 2007).
35 John E. Elmore, The Valuation of Trademark-Related Intangible Property, WILLAMETTE
MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION
(2015),
http://www.willamette.com/insights_journal/15/winter_2015_8.pdf.
36 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademark Law and Unfair Competition, § 2:3 (5th ed.).

Summer 2021

LIBERTY OR LICENTIOUSNESS

93

always convey inaccurate information—excessive false positives and falsenegatives.37 Individuals are not commodified branded goods. Therefore,
more precisely, the signal to noise ratio is appallingly bad but remains
unrecognized because of confirmation bias reinforced by the consumer's
cognitive dissonance of stereotypes.
The ubiquitous exposure to these marks (potentially even in putative
places of refuge, so-called “safe spaces”) creates an injury well known in
trademark law, the death of a mark by a thousand cuts (or infringements).38
While it is rare in legal scholarship to examine race, gender, sexual
orientation, ethnicity, and religion using trademark law, trademark law may
provide a most useful paradigm in the case of profane marks through a
trademark law lens.39 Unfortunately, some immutable characteristics such as
race, gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, as brand proxies, are
significant determinants of social capital at birth, future income, wealth,
health rather than assessing individual merit. Arguably, this analytical
construct is a bit strained because trademarks are protected because of their
commercial value against other forms of commercial speech.
Accepting that these often-immutable characteristics serve a branding
function, one needs to determine analogous trademark protection scope to be
used in this analysis. This article contends that race, gender, ethnicity,
LGBQT+ status, and religion designations may be best analyzed as famous
marks.40 A famous mark is one that is known to the general consuming public
of the United States.41 Not for all, but for many of the group-identities, the
37

Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, The Proper Place for Intellectual Property in Employment
Discrimination Law, 25 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1 (2014)(responding to Professor Rowe’s
article). There appears to be no inherent reason why IP as a BFOQ thesis could not be
extended to any situation where a human gender or religious characteristic can become part
of a commercial brand identity. For example, a restaurant that wants to reproduce the
stereotypic Gone With the Wind ante-bellum southern hospitality could require that all of the
wait
staff
must
look
like
the
Aunt
Jemina
character/logo.
See
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aunt_Jemima#Logo (explaining the symbolism of the logo).
38 Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Liberty or Licentiousness: Disinsenting Disparaging and
Scandalous Marks Post-Tam and Brunetti, 72 FLORIDA L. REV. 797 (Feb. 29, 2020).
39 Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601 (2010).
40 Cf. David Tan, The Semiotics of Alpha Brands: Encoding/Decoding/Recoding/Transcoding
of Louis Vuitton and Its Implications for Trademark Law, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. REV
225, 241 (2013) (“the well-known trademarks or alpha brands that are constitutive of our
cultural heritage have transcended their source designation function, and are symbolic of the
ideological hegemonies of social identities in contemporary society. Their recoding by
counterpublics may be viewed as [p] ractices of articulating social difference [that] are central
to democratic politics.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
41 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2)(a); See generally Jasmine Abdel-khalik, To Live in In-“Fame”y: Reconceiving Scandalous Marks As Analogous To Famous Marks, 25 CARDOZO ARTS &
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profane, offensive reference-terms that fall within this article’s scope as
profane marks, words that will need be reconstituted from merely
disparaging to the status of scandalous or indecent, are generally known to
the general consuming public of the United States.42 Further, other forms of
trademark infringement require a likelihood of consumer confusion.43 A
likelihood of consumer confusion analysis would add little to the discussion
in this article because consumers are unlikely to make goods or services
association with a profane mark.44
This article assumes that courts could analyze social-cultural-genetic
identities such as African American or LGBQT+ in part as brands or
“famous marks.” These profane terms are not only referents of an individual
or group identity; they are also terms that affect the individual or group’s
social or monetary worth in the marketplace. Derogatory, disparaging, or
profane euphemisms, such as the N-word, C-word, or F-word, carry
extremely negative connotations. Negative connotations tarnish the value of
the individual’s brand identity either by using these faux brand-labels to selfidentify or others who perceive the individual as a disparaged member
branded-group.
The article does not develop the potential ramification of a terms’ status
when used by a group member to portray a positive self-identity—an act of
semiotic democracy.45 This limitation, too, is in keeping the trademark
analogy in this article. Trademark law does not recognize the selftarnishment of a famous mark. Interestingly, the flip side of tarnishment is
the blurring of a famous mark. “Dilution by blurring consists of a single
mark identified by consumers with two different sources.”46 In race, gender,
sexual orientation, ethnicity, as brand proxies, the equivalent concept is
cultural misappropriation. “[B]orrowing may become appropriation when it
reinforces historically exploitative relationships or deprives [cultures] of
opportunities to control or benefit from their cultural material.” 47 So, the
ENT. L.J. 173 (2007).
42 See Jasmine Abdel-khalik, Disparaging Trademarks: Who Matters, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L.
287, 311-313 (2015) (discussing the conflation in trademark law of the disparaging and
scandalous prohibitions).
43 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a).
44 See infra Section II.
45 See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Redux, Successfully De-Bowdlerizing the Trademark
Register or One Person’s Vulgarity is Another Person’s Lyric, 59 IDEA: L. REV. FRANKLIN
PIERCE CENTER FOR INTELL. PROP. 89, 99 (2018) (concepts such as trans-valuing a negative
identity or reclaiming the power to name); See Tan, supra note 40, at 238.
46J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademark Law and Unfair Competition, § 24:69 (5th ed.).
47 David A. Singleton, Disrupting Victim Exploitation, 69 MERCER L. REV. 805, 807-808
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detachment of control and the economic benefits of a group’s culture so that
consumers believe that there are multiple sources for the fruits of that culture
constitute cultural appropriation. A human being or human culture’s brand
identity is deserving of at least as much protection as a trademark as a
commercial property right.

II. DISPARAGING, IMMORAL, OR SCANDALOUS MARKS: FREE
FLOATING SIGNIFIERS OF NOTHING
At the extreme end of the spectrum, the initial question is whether some
marks are so vulgar, profane, and offensive that the visceral societal
messages they convey will overwhelm their capacity to serve as a source
identifier the sine qua non of trademark law.48 Broadly, the first question is
whether disparaging, immoral, or scandalous designations (or more
significantly post-Tam and Brunetti, a narrowly defined subset of indecent
or scandalous profane marks may be constitutionally denied registration) are
capable of serving as trademarks under first principles of trademark law.49
The next question is that should these marks be registerable as trademarks,
whether once registered and infringed that the owners of these profane marks
are entitled to a full panoply of trademark remedies. In answering this
question, one should first consider what Justice Breyer wrote in his Brunetti
concurrence about the extraordinary emotional and physical impact of
profane marks, and their viability as marks before answering.50 When a
trademark is no longer capable of serving a source-identifying function, it
will lose its trademark status.51 On the flip side, if a designation does not
initially serve a source-identifying function, it was never a mark in the first
place. Further, an affirmative answer to this question also solved another
problem that of recognizing and protecting unregistered profane marks. So,
this question worth exploring briefly in this article.

(2018) (quoting Olufunmilayo Arewa, Cultural Appropriation: When ‘Borrowing’ Becomes
Exploitation, THE CONVERSATION (June 20, 2016), https://theconversation.com/culturalappropriation-when-borrowing-becomes-exploitation-57411); See also Tan, supra note 40 at
239-240.
48 See United States Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2304
(2020); 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Qualitex v. Jacobson Prod. Co, Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162-163 (1995);
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK LAW AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §3:4-§3:7.
49
See Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2304-2305.
50 See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2307 (2019) (concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
51 MCCARTY ON TRADEMARK LAW AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §12:2.
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A court’s analysis should start with a principle of viewpoint neutrality.
In determining whether a profane mark serves a source-identifying function,
the court should be agnostic whether the mark is conveying a socially
desirable message or any message other than its source. However, the court
cannot be indifferent to the profane meaning of the mark. This proposed
factor test is in keeping with the ordinary trademark analysis of a designation
purporting to be a trademark. APPLE for fruit is generic and cannot serve a
trademark function, while the designation APPLE for a technology company
is a strong (arbitrary) trademark. Note in this analysis; the court would not
consider the social valance of the term APPLE.
Profane marks may require that the courts reconsider the Abercrombie
and Fitch word-mark test and treat profane marks as presumptive descriptive
or that courts treat profane marks as trade dress in the court’s analysis. With
profane marks, the negative social valance (or viewpoint) is irrelevant. The
court must merely answer whether the profane designation is serving a
trademark source-identifying function to indicate source, origin, or
sponsorship of the associated product in the context of the marketplace to the
consumer.52
When a consumer first encounters one of these profane terms, the
consumer will have first to determine whether the term is serving a function
other than to give offense, such as to identify the source of the product. For
example, F*CK on a t-shirt. Does the viewer get over the shock of visual
assault sufficiently to engage in an internal trademark source identification
analysis? Is F*CK serving a trademark source-identifying function, or is it a
message or a social statement?53 In trademark law, this would be the
penguin cocktail shaker dilemma first posited by Justice Scalia in Walmart
v. Samara Brothers—whether a use of a mark is product design or product
packaging.54 The dilemma is whether the putative mark “is intended not to
identify the source, but to render the product itself more useful or
appealing.”55 Here, the question is whether the profane mark indicates the
source of the product or the mark as constituting the product itself.

52

Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2307 (2019).
Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. at 207. Samara Brothers is especially instructive because
it involved whether “line of spring/summer one-piece seersucker outfits decorated with
appliques of hearts, flowers, fruits, and the like” could be inherently distinctive as trade dress.
54 Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. at 213. Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence in part and
dissent in part in Brunetti that “some consumers may be attracted to products labeled with
highly vulgar or obscene words.”; Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2307. Implicitly recognizing that the
attraction of these products may be the profane term itself rather than the reputation of the
source of the product. This is not a trademark function.
55 Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. at 213.
53
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Accordingly, profane marks should never be inherently distinctive and
always require a showing of secondary meaning.56
As one court held, “[u]se of similar marks by third-party companies in
the relevant industry weakens the mark at issue.”57 Therefore, considering
the number of market entrants/participants using similar profane
designations—some as trademark/product packaging and others as
expressive product design, it is unlikely that profane terms could readily
acquire secondary meaning.58 Moreover, in the context of adult sexualized
products, a profane mark could be merely descriptive of the associated
product. Naturally, the greater the semiotic distance between the designation
and the product, the more likely it is to function as a mark. Those
designations with the most significant distance (arbitrary or fanciful marks)
from the associated product or service constitute the strongest marks.59 This
“distance” distinction may fail in the case of profane marks and their
associated goods or services
Consequently, the emotional impact of these designations and their
descriptive nature annihilates their ability to serve a trademark function.
These profane terms carry so much semiotic meaning that they are akin to
slogans or other informational marks.60 Informational marks or
informational slogans are not registerable because consumers rarely view
them as marks absent extraordinary efforts on the trademark owner’s part to
convey to the consumer than the informational mark or slogan is a trademark
and not merely a source of useful additional information.61 At best, a profane
is often a monosyllabic informational mark or descriptive of an associated
product.62
For the reasons discussed in this section, profane terms are best
described in trademark nomenclature as descriptive marks with secondary
Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. at 213-16 (“Consumers should not be deprived of the
benefits of competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design
ordinarily serves by a rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants
based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness.”).
57 M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy Ent., Corp., 421 F.3d 1073, 1088 (9th Cir. 2005).
58 See Arcona, Inc. v. Farmacy Beauty, LLC, 976 F.3d 1074, 1081 (9th Cir. 2020)
(“recognizing that third parties used similar and identical marks, and finding no reasonable
jury could find a likelihood of confusion”); M2 Software, Inc., 41 F.3d at 1088.
59 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-211 (2000) (citing
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10–11 (2d Cir. 1976)).
60 See generally Tan, supra note 40 at 229-233.
61 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademark Law and Unfair Competition, § 3:5 (5th ed.) (listing
examples of informational marks that were denied registration).
62 See e.g. Adam Sandler, Uses of the Word Fuck, https://www.letras.com/adamsandler/643438/ (using the F-word as a transitive verb, intransitive verb, adjective, adverb,
object, noun, etc.).
56
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meaning. In other words, courts should handle weak marks similarly to weak
copyrights in their analysis regarding the scope of trademark protection and
crafting remedies.63 Accordingly, the protection of profane marks, if any,
should be limited to a form of thin-trademark protection.64 Thin copyright
limits the protection against copyright infringement to only virtually
identical copies where the amount of originality in the original (infringed)
work is slight.65 So, “[w]hen the range of protectable and unauthorized
expression is narrow, the appropriate standard for illicit copying is virtual
identity.”66 In the context of trademark law, the scope of thin trademark
protection could be analytically similar to an application of trademark
counterfeiting. The court in Montres Rolex, S.A. v. Snyder defined a
counterfeit mark as “a spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially
indistinguishable from, a registered mark.”67 Analogously, the concept of a
thin or narrowly circumscribed scope of protection to the literal work is well
established in copyright law.68 In the practical application of thin-trademark
protection, the context of trademark law may require the profane mark's near
identity to the alleged infringing mark coupled with a narrow application
only to the specific types of goods or services listed in the trademark
registration. The existing multi-factor context, consumer, and marketsensitive tests used by the different circuits are sufficiently robust to adopt
this recommendation.
Some speakers for first amendment expressive speech purposes also
need these profane terms.69 Albeit a bit factiously, the registration of the
designation F*CK could have resulted in the “F*CK THE DRAFT” being
63

See Tarsus Connect, LLC v. Cvent, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1351 (ND Ga. 2020)
(“a descriptive mark with a secondary meaning . . . is “relatively weak” and [is] only “entitled
to a narrow range of protection.”).
64 See Michael Grynberg, Thick Marks, Thin Marks, 67 CASE W. L. REV. 13, 59-60 (2016)
(discussing the concept of thin-trademarks and thin-trademark protection); Ron Phillips, A
Case for Scandal and Immorality: Proposing Thin Protection of Controversial Trademarks,
17 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 55, 74-76 (2008) (suggesting limiting thin protection to
controversial marks only to inherently distinctive marks—arbitrary, fanciful or suggestive
marks).
65 See Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003); Katherine L. McDaniel and James
Jue, A Quantum of Copyright, 8 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 169, 183 (2009).
66 Apple Com., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994).
67 Montres Rolex, S.A. v. Snyder, 718 F.2d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing 15 U.S.C. §1124).
68 See Feist Pub. Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 349 (1991).
69 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971); See also MARK TWAIN, THE W IT AND
WISDOM OF MARK TWAIN (1987), https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/4957-the-differencebetween-the-almost-right-word-and-the-right (“The difference between the almost right word
and the right word is really a large matter. ’tis the difference between the lightning bug and
the lightning.”) (emphasis in original).
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resolved under the Lanham Act rather than the First Amendment.70 Many of
the uses of these profane terms by someone other than the trademark owner
would be informational or expressive rather than as a source identifier for
competing or counterfeit goods.71 Traditional trademark law only prohibits
commercial uses that result in a likelihood of consumer confusion.
Consequently, the Lanham Act does not prohibit expressive uses—and these
uses probably could not be regulated consistent with the First Amendment.
As was discussed earlier, whether an ordinary prudent consumer viewing a
profane mark, F*CK YOU would understand F*CK YOU as a trademark
indicating the source of the product or an insulting message to the viewer is
problematic in the case of profane marks. Regardless of the mark’s
commercial success, others will always desire to use the mark in its ordinary
customary meaning—either to send a message or classic trademark fair uses.
Even if these profane designations are eventually registrable (in that they
have acquired at least a weak secondary meaning and are serving a trademark
function of indicating source), there would appear to be strong trademark fair
use arguments to permit their continued widespread use by others.72 The
trademark fair use may take either of two forms: statutory (classic) fair use
or a judicially created nominative fair use.73 In the typical trademark
infringement case, the plaintiff must show that the commercial use of the
mark by another creates a likelihood of consumer confusion. Based on their
current commercial use, for example, on clothing or inexpensive consumer
goods, one may assume that most of these profane marks uses will be
expressive uses rather than trademark uses and are so unlikely to infringe the
profane mark. Moreover, the Lanham Act’s fair use defense provides that
“use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use,
otherwise than as a mark, . . . of a term or device which is descriptive of and
used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such
party or their geographic origin . . ...” So, there may be strong trademark fair
use arguments.74

70

Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16. It would not be unreasonable at the height of the Viet Nam era antiwar protests, if it was legal, that someone would have registered F*CK THE DRAFT as a
mark.
71 See J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademark Law and Unfair Competition, § 3:5 (5th ed.) (listing
examples of informational marks that were denied registration)
72United States Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2307-8 (2020);
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 118 (2004) (quoting
15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(4)).
73 See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 214 (3d Cir. 2005).
74 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2307-08.
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Furthermore, the trademark fair use defense may be a strong deterrent
against successful infringement litigation because the Lasting Impression I,
Inc., Court held that some degree of the likelihood of consumer confusion is
consistent with trademark fair use.75 Thus, statutory trademark fair use will
raise barriers to plaintiffs effectively asserting trademark rights in profane
marks.76 Also, widespread unpoliceable uses by competitors and significant
non-commercial uses will threaten if not irreversibly cause genericide to
many profane marks.77 Recently, in USPTO v. Booking.Com, the Court
seemed to waiver on this point, making it a more fact-specific analysis. The
Booking.com court observed that “The weaker a mark, the fewer are the
junior uses that will trigger a likelihood of consumer confusion.” 78 Yet, “in
a crowded field of look-alike marks, . . .consumers may have learned to
carefully pick out” one mark from another.”79
Although harshly criticized, the common law doctrine of aesthetic
functionality still survives in trademark law.80Aesthetic functionality applies
where the trademark does not drive consumer demand for the product as a
source identifier but rather by the consumer demand for the aesthetic mark
as an object in itself divorced from the product's source or reputation.81 In
this context, competitors need to use the mark to compete, and the mark no
longer serves as an indication of quality. Therefore, a broad range of uses by
competitors will not be infringing the trademark. The defense of aesthetic
functionality would often apply in profane marks infringement actions where
consumer desire is for the medium or the message (the aesthetics of the
mark) rather than a desire to have a product from a particular source with a
specific, consistent level of quality.

75

See Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. at 551.
The law is unclear whether nominative fair use is an affirmative defense with the burden
on the defendant, or whether once asserted, the plaintiff’s burden of proof on likelihood on
consumer confusion. See Brookwood Funding, LLC v. Avant Credit Corporation, Inc., (ND
Ga. 2015) 2015 WL 11504556 at n.6 (not reported in Fed. Supp.); (“The court recognizes
there is a split of authority as to whether “nominative fair use” is considered an affirmative
defense or whether it goes to plaintiff’s proof of the likelihood of confusion element.
Compare Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1182 (9th Cir. 2010) (not
affirmative defense) with Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211,
228–31 (3d Cir 2005) (affirmative defense). The Supreme Court has ruled that “classic fair
use” is an affirmative defense. See KP Permanent Make–Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,
Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004).”).
77 United States Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2307-8 (2020).
78 See Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2307 (Citation omitted).
79
See Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2307 (Citation omitted and quotation modified).
80 See J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademark Law and Unfair Competition, § 7:80 (5th ed.).
81 McKenney & Long, Federal Unfair Competition: Lanham Act Section 43(a) § 5:19 (1989).
76
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Finally, other doctrines of law may result in a plethora of quasi-mark
uses that further dilute the profane designation's capacity to achieve
secondary meaning and narrow its capacity to serve as only the thinnest of
trademarks.82 For example, the Rogers v. Grimaldi balancing test that further
limit the scope of trademark protection available expressive uses of profane
marks to “only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion
outweighs the public interest in free expression.”83 While the early cases,
involved disputes over clearly expressive works such as titles to motion
pictures or virtual products in video games, the Rogers balancing test is
increasingly robust. For example, in VIP Products LLC. v. Jack Daniel’s
Properties, Inc, the court found that a dog toy was an expressive work
because it conveyed a humorous message.84 Using the two-pronged Rogers
balancing test, courts will only find trademark infringement in an expressive
work if the mark's use is explicitly misleading.85 The Rogers balancing test
merely requires no artistic relevance, or if there is artistic relevance, it is
misleading.86 Under the first prong, the level of relevance merely needs to
be above zero.87 Under the second prong, it is not enough that consumers be
misled, that there is a likelihood of consumer confusion. The court must
decide “whether there was an ‘explicit indication,’ ‘overt claim,’ or ‘explicit
misstatement’ that caused such consumer confusion.”88 As the court noted
in VIP Products, LLC, “[T]he Constitution looks beyond written or spoken
words as mediums of expression.”89 Few, if any, products using profane
marks could not claim credibly that the profane mark's use was also artistic
or expressive.90

82

For example, in the area of constitutional law, the Tam and Brunetti courts did not address
whether enforcement was government speech. See Yvette Joy Liebesman, Offensive Mark
Owners have an Enforcement Problem, 59 HOUS. L. REV., 31, (forthcoming) (manuscript on
file with author).
83 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
84 VIP Products LLC. v. Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc., 953 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020).
85 See Lisa P. Ramsey, Free Speech Challenges to Trademark Law After Matal v. Tam, 56
HOUSTON L. REV. 401, 438 (2018).
86 See Twentieth Century Fox Televisions v. Empire Distr., Inc., 875 F.3d. 1192, 1198-1199
(9th Cir. 2017).
87 Id. at 1198.
88 Id. at 1199.
89 Id. at 1175 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S.
557, 569 (1995)).
90
But see Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 452-453 (6th Cir. 2003) (remanding on the
question of the use of Rosa Parks’ name as a title to the Outkast’s song Back of the Bus despite
the fact that Ms. Parks is a civil rights heroine in part for her refusal to surrender her seat on
a bus to a white passenger and move to the back of the bus.).
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Although this article recommends that courts adopt these forms of
analysis to discourage the development of profane designations as marks
though government subvention, the article’s analytical position is also
consistent with robust first amendment principles to keep profane terms in
the public domain rather than allowing commercial interests to capture them
and to incentivize their further use or legitimatization.91 Accordingly,
traditional viewpoint-neutral black letter requirements of either common law
or statutory trademark law may be sufficient if applied regularly and deftly
to prevent the registration or enforcement of profane marks by ensuring that
profane marks serve a trademark function before registration and continue to
do so throughout the life of the mark and that the alleged infringing use falls
within the narrow ambit of commercial uses that trademark law prohibits in
the context of a profane mark.92

III. A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL §2(A) OF THE LANHAM ACT
(PROPOSAL)
For the past seventy years, the disparaging, immoral, and scandalous
clauses of § 2(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act provided a statutory bulwark
to keep the trademark register relatively clean of offensive or profane
marks.93 The Court Post-Tam and Brunetti eliminated the prohibition on
federally registering disparaging, immoral, or scandalous marks.94
Bowdlerizes of the trademark register must seek new tools to discourage the
commercial development of disparaging, immoral, or scandalous marks. The
Court’s opinion in Tam and Brunetti may have left some lacunae in which
Congress could act. Rather than just accepting either of two unlikely
solutions, successfully challenging Tam and Brunetti’s wisdom or Congress
enacting constitutionally firmer legislation. This article will move on in
section IV to suggest an alternative approach that individuals who contend
that these profane marks are unworthy of trademark protection should shift
the battle from the federal registration of the profane mark to its enforcement
and the limiting doctrines in equity law.
In light of the Court’s holding in Matal v. Tam, while the opinion is well
subject to criticism, it is unlikely that the Court will reconsider its holding,
91

See Ramsey, supra note 85, at 466-469.
to these marks that it is not clear that any one claimant
will ever be able to establish secondary meaning the most profane of these marks, and if so,
it will be a very narrow zone of protection (aka thin-trademark).
93
11 U.S.C. § 1052(a); See generally Megan M. Carpenter, NSFW: An Empirical Study of
Scandalous Trademarks, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321 (2015).
94 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1744 (2017).
92 There are so many possible claimants
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nor is it likely that Congress could amend the Lanham Act to prohibit the
registration of disparaging trademarks. However, several justices in Iancu v.
Brunetti may have pointed to Congress a narrow constitutional path to
banning some federal registration of scandalous, obscene, vulgar, and
profane marks.95 There is also a possibility that the worst excesses of
disparaging trademarks may be denied federal registration; for example, the
N-word, C-word, or F-word could be considered indecent or scandalous
under the rubric proposed in this section.96 This section will briefly examine
the possibilities of artful statutory solutions. However, even if Congress
could enact a narrow constitutionally firm prohibition against registering
some scandalous marks that carry the potential for protected commercial
speech, there does not seem to be the legislative or political will at this time
for such a revision of the Lanham Act.97
A. REMOVING THE VULGAR OR PROFANE FROM THE TRADEMARK
LEXICON
As the Tam Court noted, Congress was not required to pass a law
providing trademark registration or protection. Congress has so-far
permissibly prohibited specific terms or symbols from being used as
trademarks. The simplest solution is for Congress to make a substation in the
text of §2(a). Currently, §2(a) provides that “No trademark . . . . shall be
refused registration . . .unless . . . (a) Consists of or comprises immoral,
deceptive, or scandalous matter . . .”98 “Immoral, deceptive, or scandalous”
could be changed to “obscene, vulgar, or profane matter . . .” 99 Such
clarification should overcome the Court’s objections in Brunetti. Further,
Congress could explicitly or through firm statements in the legislative

95

Even absent a federal law, a court may be able to deny profane marks common law
protection. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2312 (2019).
96 See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2312 n. 5. (Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Breyer joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that at least one racial epithet may fall
under the rubric of indecent or scandalous); See also Abdel-khalik, supra note 41, at 204-209;
see generally Gary Myers, It’s Scandalous!—Limiting Profane Trademark Registrations after
Tam and Brunetti, 27 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 10-11 (2019).
97 Significant institutional players such as International Trademark Association (INTA)
oppose it. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the International Trademark
Association in Support of Respondent, Lee v. Tam, available at 2016 WL 7405846 (U.S.);
Amicus Curiae Brief of the International Trademark Association in Support of Respondent,
Iancu v. Brunetti, available at 2019 WL 1453517 (U.S.). Further, the weight of the amicus
brief filings in both cases were clearly in favor to limiting or striking § 2(a).
98 15 U.S.C. §1052(a).
99 Myers, supra note 96, at 18.
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history guide the courts as to which body of relevant case law to use when
interpreting these terms in the context of a specific mark.
Congress could also expressly provide a list of designations that could
not be registered as federal trademarks selected on some viewpoint-neutral
reason appropriately narrowly tailored to serve a constitutionally permissible
public purpose.100 Congress could amend the Lanham Act §2(a)’s immoral
or scandalous bar to make it expressly viewpoint neutral and give the USPTO
and the courts the ability over time to expand or to decrease the list of
prohibited terms based on statutorily defined societal norms.101 Congress has
statutorily awarded trademark and trademark-like rights to public and private
entities. The justices in their concurrences cite facially neutral justifications
for a policy limiting scandalous trademark registration regulation.102
Congress merely needs to select at least one narrowly drawn substantial
government interest to deny federal registration to scandalous marks.103
Assuming that a mark is commercial speech, however if the mark is not
commercial speech, Congress would need a compelling government interest
coupled with a narrowly tailored law.104 In either case, Congress has
managed to do so in other contexts, so in essence, this proposal is a return to
the status quo ante with a constitutionally permissive twist.105
Alternatively, Congress could grant the USPTO as an administrative
agency (possibly subject to the Administrative Procedures Act) the power to
create a constitutionally tailored list of scandalous marks using viewpointneutral justifications to determine which designations get placed on this
list.106 Or similar to the FCC regulation of indecent speech in on-air
100

See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2298 (2019).
See Id.; See also Ramsey, supra note 85, at 430-432.
102 See infra Section III(C).
103See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 17654 (2017) (declining to decide if trademarks are
commercial speech, but applying the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard); but see
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (“I continue to believe that when the
government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict
scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in question may be characterized as
‘commercial.’”).
104 See Ramsey, supra note 85, at 435-436.
105 Amending the Lanham Trademark Act may require more than a technical change to the
definitional understanding or colloquial use of scandalous to incorporate a statutorily defined
concept of profanity or indecency. See Section III; the USPTO was inconsistent in its
application of the pre-Tam and Brunetti rules to rejecting trademarks. See Carpenter, supra
note 93, at 334-345; See also Abdel-khalik, supra note 42, at 313-314; Simon Tam, First
Amendment, Trademarks, and “The Slants: Our Journey to the Supreme Court, 12 BUFFALO
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (disparate impact of the PTOs inconsistent application of §
2(a) on minority groups).
106 Cf. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 567 U.S. 239 (2012) (discussing the FCC regulation
101

Summer 2021

LIBERTY OR LICENTIOUSNESS

105

broadcast television and radio, Congress could continue its current practice
of providing the USTPO with some generic criteria such as obscene,
indecent, or scandalous with some narrowing principles in either the
statutory text or the legislative history as guided by the dissents in Tam.107
Still, respect for first amendment values would require a clear statement of
Congress’s intent to guide agency discretion.
The least effective method of eliminating scandalous marks would be a
final list, whether created by Congress or the USPTO; the meaning of words
evolve—one generation’s profanity is another generation’s euphemisms and
the third generations vernacular.108 Consequently, over time, the list of
prohibited profane terms must change to reflect contemporary attitudes and
ideas of obscenity, scandal, indecency, words, and symbols added or deleted
from the available trademark lexicon as a living culture demands.109 Changes
not a one-way street. Existing trademark (property) rights should be
protected. At the same time, those terms may be recapture or released for
registration as to new marks in the future as societal values change, as will
their scope of protection in equity. Therefore, the USPTO should be required
to review this list and consider expressions of public opinion regularly—
perhaps every three years like the Library of Congress’s review DMCA
circumvention exemptions.110 Regardless of the approach used by Congress
or the USPTO, the burden of showing that a proposed designation is not
registerable as a scandalous mark should be on the USPTO. 111 Placing the
burden to refuse registration on the government and providing a narrowly
tailored definition of the types of terms that are unregistrable is a paradigm
of indecent speech in broadcast on air content). Contra n.17.
107 See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2308 (Breyer, J.); Chris Cochran, It’s “FUCT”: The Demise of
the Lanham Act, 59 IDEA 333, 360-364 (2019).
108 See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2307 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (noting
that profane words change overtime); MELISSA MOHR, HOLY SHIT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
SWEARING 254-258 (Oxford Univ. Press 2013); See also Timothy Jay, The Utility and
Ubiquity of Taboo Words, 4 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 153, 156 (2009)
(Taboo words remain relatively stable over time and the 10 most frequent used terms account
for 80% of the data) available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.17456924.2009.01115.x.
109 Cf. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
110 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(E); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429,
440 (2d Cir. 2001). The proposed review process could also follow other administrative
processed such as those used by the FCC when considering what constitutes indecent speech.
Even departments of motor vehicles have developed lists of words that cannot be used on
license plates; See Martybeth Herald, Licensed To Speak: The Case of Vanity Plates, 72 U. OF
COLO. L. REV. 595, 596 & n.8 (2001) (citing statutes). There are numerous models from which
to choose that would provide both flexibility and consistency.
111 See In re Standard Elektrik Lorenz Aktiengesellschaft, 371 F.2d 870, 873 (CCPA 1967).
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that is most consistent with first amendment values and trademarks as
commercial choices respond to a market economy.
B. §2(A) LANHAM ACT “DISPARAGING” MARKS
Considering the Court’s holding in Matal v. Tam, that disparagement as
defined by § 2(a) of the Lanham Act was a form of unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination, Congress and future judicial decisions must
recharacterize the worst excesses of a disparagement such a racial, gender,
gender identity, sexual orientation, religious, or ethnic epitaphs as falling
under the rubric of scandalous.112 This shift in focus can be done
constitutionally by focusing on how (manner) something was communicated
rather than the message itself (viewpoint). However, many disparaging
terms denied registration under the existing pre-Tam § 2(a) would never
reach the level of constituting scandalous marks—a proposed narrow subset
disparaging marks that are simultaneously obscene, vulgar, or profane.113
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act prohibited the USPTO from granting
trademark registration to marks that “disparage . . . or bring . . . into
contemp[t] or disrepute and persons, living or dead.”114 Unfortunately,
depending on the trademark examiner and the day’s politics, many of these
terms escaped scrutiny and became ensconced on the trademark register.115
The Tam Court rested its holding on the bedrock first amendment principle
that ideas cannot be suppressed merely because ideas are offensive to some
members of the public—viewpoint discrimination.116
112

See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2307 (2019) citing M. MOHR , supra note 108, at
252, 254, 256 (2013) (“And the list of swear words may be evolving yet again, perhaps in the
direction of including race-based epithets.”).
113 See Regan Smith, Trademark Law and Free Speech: Protection for Scandalous and
Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451, 480 (2007) (“Given the wide
divergence of cultural attitudes towards indecency, the hurdle for what is scandalous to a
“substantial composite of the general public” must be exceedingly high if the public is defined
as the American people. This may mean in practice that the “scandalous” test will be met less
often than the “disparaging” test, if it is met at all. Additionally, whereas the denial of a
scandalous trademark removes the mark from use by everybody, the denial of a disparaging
trademark can be seen as preserving that trademark for a different registrant.”).
114 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1753 (2017).
115 See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1756; Ramsey, supra note 85, at 422-423.
116 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763. Almost all federally registered trademarks begin their lives as
common law trademarks, and much of the federal litigation involving trademarks are under §
43(a) of the Lanham Act which protects non-registered trademarks. It is not clear whether in
the case of an unregistreted trademark a federal or state court could use common law rules
and public policies to determine that the mark is unenforceable. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d.
1321, 1343-1344 (Fed. Cir. 2015); aff’d on other grounds, Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct 1744
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At least one commentator has observed that the Court may have
erroneously conflated viewpoint discrimination with the giving of offense in
applying this core first amendment principle in the context of disparaging
marks.117 There are at least two speech acts in the case of a disparaging
mark.118 The first and most apparent is the giving of offense to members of
the disparaged group (and perhaps to the population at large). The second
speech is the expression of a viewpoint. It is easy to conflate these two ideas
because most disparaging terms carry an overwhelming legacy of offensive
stereotypes laden with one-dimensional caricatures of the disparaged group;
consequently, offensive speech regulation cannot be viewpoint neutral.
The Tam Court seemed divided equally on the question of whether
axiomatically offense equals viewpoint.119 However, the justices all agreed
that the language of §2(a) constituted constitutionally impermissible
viewpoint discrimination by the government. Justice Alito opined in the
plurality opinion that to the degree disparagement clause of § 2(a) may have
had a constitutionally legitimate objective such as to drive out discriminatory
commercial conduct, the disparagement clause was not narrowly tailored to
eliminate only invidious discrimination.120 The holding in Tam would have
been more persuasive and unlikely to bleed into other areas of First
Amendment jurisprudence had the Court expressly considered the offensive
speech line of cases, such as Cohen v. California and FCC v. Pacifica

(2017). States would also be free to interpret state trademark law terms such as disparaging
or scandalous narrowly in order to avoid the impermissible viewpoint discrimination that the
Court found in Tam and Brunetti. See Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 146 (1996) (Stevens,
J., dissenting on other grounds, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.) (“[T]he decision
of a federal court (even this Court) on a question of state law is not binding on state
tribunals”)). This may merely mean that the battle over profane marks will be shifted to other
gounds such as whether there was ever a designation functioning as a trademark in the first
place rather than if the designiation itself is registerable as a trademark. However, any further
discussion of these interesting issues is outside the scope of this article.
117 See Clay Calvert, Merging Offensive-Speech Cases with Viewpoint Discrimination
Principles: The Immediate Impact of Matal v. Tam on Two Strands of First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 27 WM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 829, 831 (2019).
118 See Michiel Bot, The Right to Offend? Contested Speech Acts and Critical Democratic
Practice, 24 LAW & LITERATURE 232, 251-53 (2012); See generally Peter Meijes Tiersma,
The Language of Defamation, 66 TEX. L. REV. 303, 305-06 (1987).
119 Compare Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (“Giving offense is a viewpoint.”) (Alito, Roberts,
Thomas, and Breyer) with Tam, 137 S. Ct at 1765 (striving to give a more nuanced definition
of viewpoint discrimination) (Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan). Justice Gorsuch
did not participate in this case. Based on the majority opinion in Brunetti, it is likely that
Justice Gorsuch would have joined the Alito, Roberts, Thomas, and Breyer faction. Although,
these seems to conflict cause with effect.
120 Ramsey, supra note 85, at 420.
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Foundation.121 The Cohen-Pacifica line of cases focused on the
government’s legitimate interest in regulating how an idea is expressed
(manner) rather than its possible illicit interest in regulating the idea being
expressed (viewpoint). The government has a greater interest in protecting
civility and public morality in public interactions than regulating the
speaker’s motivation or ideology.122 In the future, because the Court failed
to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech, nor did the
Court create a sui generis first amendment law for trademarks, lower courts
should apply traditional First Amendment jurisprudence in deciding First
Amendment challenged to trademark law.123 The Constitution and the First
Amendment permit the government to control the rules of war governing the
battle in the marketplace of ideas but not choose winners or losers or even
place too massive a thumb to tilt the board in a favored direction.
Suppose Congress had focused on the harm that the registration of these
marks caused by using another more neutral term rather than the
semantically loaded connotation and denotation carried by the term
disparaging, the Court could have more readily have reached an
interpretation that would have upheld §2(a)’s refusal to register
“disparaging” marks clause with perhaps some minor constitutional
limitations. This result would not be a far stretch. The Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board and the Federal Circuit consistently held that
“[d]isparagement is essentially a violation of one’s right of privacy—the
right to be ‘let alone’ from contempt or ridicule.”124 The right of privacy is a
point not adequately addressed by the court in Tam. In other contexts, courts
have upheld rights of privacy and protection against defamation against
constitutional challenges.125
The Miller v. California line of obscenity cases requires that the
challenged content be “patently offensive” as an element of whether the
content is legally obscene may have to be reconsidered by the Court.126
Whether those cases will survive, without revision, if giving offensive is a
121

See Calvert, supra note 76, at 833-34. Justice Sotomayor joined by Justce Breyer in their
concurrence and dissent in part in Brunetti did mention the “Cohen-Pacifica” line of cases;
See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2313-2314 (2019) There appears to be no mention or
discussion in Tam.
122 Id.
123 See Ramsey, supra note 85, at 432-433.
124 Greyhound Corp. v Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635, 1636 (TTAB 1988)
(“Disparagement is essentially a violation of one’s right of privacy—the right to be ‘let alone’
from contempt or ridicule.”).
125
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-342 (1974) (defamation); Schulman v.
Group W. Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478 (Cal. 1998); Rest. 2d Torts, § 558 & § 652D.
126 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
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protected viewpoint is an open question of whether Tam and Brunetti's broad
scope is dicta or holding. The scope of the question is significant to this
article primarily because when the Court returned to this issue again in Iancu
v. Brunetti, and it was faced with the federal registration of an immoral or
scandalous mark, a divided Court had to consider the manner (or mode) of
speech apart from the message of the speech. Considering, the court was
unanimous in striking down §2(a)’s disparagement clause, and it was
unanimous that §2(a)’s disparagement clause was not viewpoint neutral, it is
unlikely that the Lanham Act could be amended to have a viewpoint-neutral
disparagement clause. Consequently, critics of registering racial slurs, ethnic
stereotypes, and religious bigotry as federal trademarks must look elsewhere
in the Lanham Act, for example, limiting their registration under the rubric
of scandalous marks or creating new categories such as indecent or profane
marks that track statutory language that the Court has approved of in other
contexts.
C. §2(A) LANHAM ACT “SCANDALOUS” OR “IMMORAL” MARKS
Two years after Tam, the Court again considered a §2(a) issue whether
the Lanham Act’s prohibition of registering immoral or scandalous marks
was an impermissible viewpoint regulation.127 The designation in question
here was F-U-C-T.128 As a matter of statutory interpretation, although there
is an “or” between scandalous and immoral in the Lanham Act text, courts
and the USPTO have treated these two terms as a unitary bar, giving both
words the same meaning, treating one word or the other as superfluous or a
nullity.129 The Brunetti court followed Tam’s reasoning and concluded that
§2(a)’s immoral or scandalous bar represented viewpoint discrimination.
The TTAB found that the designation F-U-C-T in the context that the
respondent Brunetti was using the mark, F-U-C-T had two messages one was
sexual (immoral), and the other represented “misogyny, nihilism or
violence” (scandalous).130 Either of which interpretations of the designation
F-U-C-T under prior pre-Tam TTAB or Federal Circuit precedent rendered
the mark unregistrable as immoral, scandalous, or vulgar.131
127

Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
Id.
129 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2298 (2019); But see 139 S. Ct. at 2310-11 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in part); See Jasmine Abdel-khalik, To Live in In-“Fame”-y: Reconceiving
Scandalous Marks As Analogous To Famous Marks, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 173, 182
(2007).
130 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2298.
131 Id.
128
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Designations may not be denied registration or protection as marks
merely because of the viewpoint represented by the designation.132 The court
held that designations under the Lanham Act §2(a)’s immoral or scandalous
bar are
“immoral” when it is “inconsistent with rectitude, purity, or
good morals”; “wicked”; or “vicious.” So, the Lanham Act permits
registration of marks that champion society’s sense
of rectitude and morality, but not marks that denigrate those
concepts. And material is “scandalous” when it “giv[es] offense to
the conscience or moral feelings”; “excite[s] reprobation”; or
“call[s] out condemnation.”
The Lanham Act allows registration of marks when their messages
accord with, but not when their messages defy, society’s sense of decency or
propriety. On its face, the statute distinguishes between two opposed sets of
ideas: those aligned with conventional moral standards and those hostile to
them, those inducing societal nods of approval and those provoking offense
and condemnation.133
Thus, facially and textually, §2(a)’s immoral or scandalous bar
represents an impermissible form of viewpoint discrimination.
Striving to the save §2(a)’s immoral or scandalous bar to trademark
registration, the government unsuccessfully argued that the Court should
ignore the ordinary dictionary meanings and the 70-year history of pastinterpretations by the USPTO and construe §2(a)’s immoral or scandalous
bar narrowly to shift from offensive-viewpoint discrimination to an
offensive-mode of communication regulation analysis.134 The Court would
have had to ellipse out the term “immoral” because immoral is “inconsistent
with rectitude, purity, or good morals,” “wicked,” or “vicious.”135 Before
Brunetti, the USPTO “ask[ed] whether a “substantial composite of the
general public” would find the mark “shocking to the sense of truth, decency,
or propriety,” “giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings,” “calling
out for condemnation,” “disgraceful,” “offensive,” “disreputable,” or

Id. at 2301-02. In Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1752 n.1 (2017), the Court opined “We need
not decide today whether respondent could bring suit under § 43(a) if his application for
federal registration had been lawfully denied under the disparagement clause.” The point
seems to have been decided without analysis in Brunetti. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2297.
133
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2299.
134 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2301.
135 Id. at 2299.
132
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“vulgar.”136 According to the Court, this definition represents impermissible
viewpoint discrimination.
Conversely, the government contended that the term scandalous, as used
in § 2(a), is suspectable to a strained, but constitutional reading if properly
construed narrowly by the Court. The government urged the Court to hold
that scandalous only means lewd, sexually explicit, or profane marks. It did
not include the broader dictionary definitions or the past practices and
interpretations of the USPTO and the lower courts.137 As interpreted by the
government, the term scandalous would then be a mode or manner restriction
and not a viewpoint restriction. Rejecting the government’s preferred
interpretation of 2(a)’s the immoral or scandalous bar to trademark
registration, the Court declined to opine on whether a more focused
prohibition on lewd, sexually explicit, or profane marks would be
permissible a permissible bar nor did the Court opine on how to evaluate
such a viewpoint-neutral trademark registration scheme.138
Thus, the Court left the door open for some future trademark registration
regulation of the most egregious designations. Four justices writing in
dissent may have pointed a narrow constitutional path. Justice Alito, in his
concurrence, wrote that:
Our decision does not prevent Congress from adopting a more
carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks
containing vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of
ideas. The particular mark in question, in this case, could be denied
registration under such a statute. The term suggested by that mark
is not needed to express any idea and, as commonly used today,
generally signifies nothing except emotion and a severely limited
vocabulary. The registration of such marks serves only to coarsen
our popular culture coarsens further our popular culture. But we
are not legislators and cannot substitute a new statute for the one
now in force.139
Chief Justice Roberts, concurring in part and dissenting in part, wrote “I
also agree that regardless of how exactly the trademark registration system
is best conceived under our precedents—a question we left open in Tam—
refusing registration to obscene, vulgar, or profane marks does not offend
136

Id. at 2298.
Id. at 2301; See also id. at, 2302 n*.
138 Id. at 2302, n*.
139 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito apparently following
conventional wisdom regarding the size of a speaker’s vocabulary and the use profanity.
137
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the First Amendment . . .. Meanwhile, the Government has an interest in not
associating itself with trademarks whose content is obscene, vulgar, or
profane. The First Amendment protects the freedom of speech; it does not
require the Government to give aid and comfort to those using obscene,
vulgar, and profane modes of expression.”140
Justice Breyer wrote concurring in part and dissenting in part, that “I
would conclude that the prohibition on registering ‘scandalous’ marks does
not ‘wor[k] harm to First Amendment interests that is disproportionate in
light of the relevant regulatory objectives.’ I would therefore uphold this
part of the statute. I agree with the Court, however, that the bar on registering
‘immoral’ marks violates the First Amendment.”141
Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justice Breyer) wrote concurring in part
and dissenting in part that “rather than read the relevant text as the majority
does, it is equally possible to read that provision’s bar on the registration of
‘scandalous’ marks to address only obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity. Such
a narrowing construction would save that duly enacted legislative text by
rendering it a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral restriction on speech that is
permissible in the context of a beneficial governmental initiative like the
trademark-registration system.”142
While the justices are collectively often more than the sum of their
individual positions, there seem to be at least four votes supporting some
form of a limited prohibition on registering scandalous marks, if the term
scandalous is limited to the obscene, vulgar, and profane designations. There
also appears to be five justices who are unwilling to state a position at this
time. One may conclude that a properly drafted amendment to §2(a)’s
immoral or scandalous bar written to prohibit the registration of obscene,
vulgar, or profane designations in a viewpoint-neutral manner, would pass
first amendment muster. This proposed amendment to the Lanham Act is as
simple as Congress developing a legislative history and a record supporting
viewpoint-neutral societal or commercial trademark purposes that would be
served by excluding obscene, vulgar, or profane marks from trademark
registration and redefining the term scandalous to be limited to profane or
indecent marks. Those words, names, symbols, or devices, or any
140

Id. at 2303-04 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The author
assumes that Chief Justice Roberts is not using “obscene” in its technical meaning in first
amendment jurisprudence, rather he is using the term in a sense akin to meaning pornographic
or salacious. If Chief Justice Roberts merely limited obscene marks that those which is already
banned by other laws would make his concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion totally
superfluous.
141 Id. at 2308 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142 Id. at 2308 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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combinations thereof that have historically been subject to constitutionally
valid regulation under other statutes because they can be regulated on
viewpoint-neutral grounds and play little if any role in expressing ideas.

IV. MORALITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Assertions of public morality have always been at the heart of
intellectual property rights in the United States. A more cynical commentator
may describe these public assertions more accurately and alliteratively as
prudish public puffery. At one point in history, courts viewed morality as an
element of the creation or enforcement of copyright, patent, and trademark
law. Of the four historical forms of intellectual property, the odd one out is
trade secret law. In the case of a trade secret, unlike the prior three types of
intellectual property, the court’s moral lens was not on the plaintiff’s creation
of the right or the enforcement of the right, but rather on the morality of the
defendant’s use or acquisition of the trade secret. This section will briefly
discuss morality and the enforcement of intellectual property rights to lay a
foundation for a subsequent discussion of equity, trademark law, and profane
marks.
A. COPYRIGHT
In the earliest days of copyright, the existence and enforcement of an
author’s copyright against an infringer were inextricably tied to the morality
of the work.143 These old cases recognized the work's lawfulness; for
example, whether the work was obscene was a matter for state or local law.
However, the court always had an independent duty under copyright law and
a separate duty imposed by equity to determine whether to issue an
injunction to protect such a work. Courts reached this conclusion through
different channels. Some courts looked at Congressional intent when
Congress enacted copyright laws. Others looked to the U.S. Constitution, art.
I, § 8, cl. 8, to find that works that are injurious to public morality fail “to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts.” Consequently, such
copyrighted works were unprotectable as a matter of constitutional law even
if Congress affirmatively desired to protect such works independently
statutorily under copyright law.144 Of course, some belt and suspender judges
used both the constitution and the copyright act as a basis to deny protection
to immoral works.
143
144

See e.g., McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co., 220 F. 837 (5th Cir. 1915);
Maguire, 16 F. Cas. at 922-23.
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i. The Evolving Case Law of Copyright Morality
For most U.S. history, the black letter law was that works of authorship
harmful to public morality were uncopyrightable or at least not worthy of
protection by equity. The black letter law of copyright morality survived
until the 1970s when the sexual revolution and the evolving first amendment
jurisprudence of obscenity roiled the basic premises of copyright law. The
zeitgeist of the time read two lower court cases as a tsunami cleansing over
150 years of black letter law from the casebooks, including doctrines cited
by the U.S. Supreme Court with approval. While copyright morality was a
well-established judicial doctrine governing copyrights, and, infused into the
principles of equity, lower courts without a firm command from Congress or
even a hint the U.S. Supreme Court began to reconsider well established first
principles of copyright law. Lower courts did so in light of other tangentially
related case law that was evolving at the same time: the statutes and case law
governing obscenity. As it will be demonstrated below, the common law
doctrine of copyright morality was simultaneously much broader and
narrower than the rules of law governing obscenity.
ii. Belcher v. Tarbox
In Belcher v. Tarbox, the Court considered a copyright challenge under
the 1909 Copyright Act to a magazine that allegedly taught a fraudulent and
inefficacious gambling method on horse races.145 The Tarbox court’s
majority erroneously conflated the existence of the copyright act’s author’s
right with the entitlement to a remedy in equity for copyright infringement.
The Tarbox court declined to pass on the truth (or falsity) of the infringed
work.146 The Tarbox court observed that “The gravity and immensity of the
problems, theological, philosophical, economic and scientific, that would
confront a court if this view were adopted are staggering to contemplate. It
is surely not a task lightly to be assumed, and we decline the invitation to
assume it.”147 However, the parties had not presented this issue before the
Tarbox court. Rhetorically, the majority took a snowball and turned it into
an avalanche with this slippery slope fallacy.148

145

Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1088.
147 Id. at 1088.
148 Id. at 1088.
146
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The narrow factual issue before the court was not a tremendous
metaphysical truth. Instead, a false statement that a wagering method on
horse racing was devised using computer technology when no computer was
used in the analysis that created this wagering method.149 This type of narrow
factual claim is resolved almost daily under trademark law or false or
deceptive advertising law.150 And while further development on this topic is
outside the scope of this article, there are sufficiently sound principles of
trademark law (and tort law) that mandate courts to distinguish fact from
opinion, philosophy from science, and metaphysics from physics.151 Even as
a public policy argument, in the context of copyright law, the difficulty in
determining the truth or falsity of a copyrighted work making factual
assertions is a weak contention to support rejecting copyright morality. The
more creative a work is, the less likely courts could (or should) make a fact
versus opinion distinction.
Tarbox's dissent correctly distinguished between the copyrightability of
the work under copyright law and the entitlement to an injunction to prevent
copyright infringement under equity principles.152 Consequently, the dissent
focused on “whether the court, [when] applying equitable principles
mandated by 17 U.S.C. § 112,” could decide that an equitable remedy was
warranted.153 The dissent noted that, while the copyright act does not state
that courts are to pass upon the truth or falsity of the views in copyrighted
material, 17 U.S.C. § 112 provides that in granting relief to vindicate rights
under the copyright act, the courts shall grant injunctions “according to the
course and principles of courts of equity.”154
149

Id. at 1089.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2012); See generally J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, Ch 27 (5th ed. 2017).
151 See, e.g. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); Skydive Az, Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105, 1110
(9th Cir. 2012). Courts adjudicating trademark disputes are also often called upon to
distinguish between commercial speech and core first amendment speech; See, e.g. Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 547-48 (5th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other
grounds by Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 124
(2014) (abrogating the standing requirements). Amway Corp. considered the relative
protections for core first amendment speech and commercial speech; Id. at 548-49. The court
then considered the motivation of the speaker and whether it was commercial or socialpolitical speech; Id. at 550-51. Of course, this distinction resulted in differing levels of
protection and liability for the same statement; Id. at 552-53. Accord Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1990) (constitutional distinction between fact and opinion in
defamation law).
152
Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1089, n.1 (9th Cir. 1973) (Wallace, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 1089 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 1089 n.1 (quotation marks in original) (17 U.S.C. § 112, amended by the 1976
Copyright Act).
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The text of § 112 of the 1909 Copyright Act and the dissent reinforce
Congress’s intent and the court’s execution of that intent not to depart from
the traditional equity practice principles.155 Unlike the majority opinion
(which was rhetorically strong but weak on supporting law), the dissent
relied very carefully on well-established legal principles. Significantly,
Stone & McCarrick, the precedent that the majority summarily dismissed
with a five-word phrase “[w]e think that decision unsound,”156 had been cited
by the U.S. Supreme Court with approval in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger
Co.157 In G.S. Suppiger Co., the court observed that in copyright law, like in
trademark law, a court of equity will deny relief for work infringement that
harms the public interest.158 When using the right granted to copyright,
patent, and trademark owners are subverting the public policy, the rights
owner cannot seek the protection of a court of equity. The Ninth Circuit later
cases uses a prudential rule that the “dicta of the Supreme Court have a
weight that is greater than ordinary judicial dicta as a prophecy of what that
Court might hold. We should not blandly shrug them off because they were
not a holding.”159 This analysis provides no reason to justify departure from
this rule with a cursory shrug, especially in Tarbox, where the dismissed
precedent was cited with approval and in support of the Court’s holding.160
In his dissent, Judge Wallace stated a cogent policy justification for
denying some copyrightable works the protection of equity.
By allowing copyright protection to such material, the law is
not only condoning fraud but also placing its power, endorsement,
and support behind fraudulent works. Persons who heretofore have
never composed fraudulent literature can do so and seek solace in
the law as the protector of their copyrighted fraud. I submit that
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See Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 1033, n.
194 (1970).
156 Belcher, 486 F.2d at 1088.
157 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1941), abrogated on other
grounds by Illinois Tool Works Inc., v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42 (2006); See
Tarbox, 486 F.2d at 1089.
158 See G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. at 494.
159 Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 935 (9th Cir. 1992).
160 The Fifth Circuit in Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852
(5th Cir. 1979) provided an extensive critical analysis of Stone & McCarrick which
distinguished the precedent relied on by the Stone & McCarrick court as an erroneous,
excessive interpretation of case law, including subsequent US Supreme Court cases that
preclude the application of equity to subvert congressional intent. 604 F.2d at 864-865 & n.25.
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this is detrimental to our legal system and not in the public
interest.161
By granting protection to such works, equity does not provide an
economic incentive to their creation or does it hinder their dissemination.
Equity merely leaves the copyright owner with whatever damages the owner
is entitled to by law.
iii. Mitchel Brothers Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater
Two modern federal circuit courts (the 5th and the 9th) have considered
whether obscenity was grounds for denying copyright in the following cases:
Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, and Jartech, Inc. v.
Clancy.162 The Fifth Circuit in Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult
Theater provided the apparent coup de grâce to copyright morality. First, the
Court noted that the 1909 Copyright Act did not explicitly authorize either
the courts or the Library of Congress to deny copyright registration to works
based on the work‘s immorality.163 In support of this, the court noted that the
1909 Copyright Act granted protection to “all works of an author.”164 The
court in Mitchell Bros. Film Group then noted Congress’s long history of
expanding the types of works eligible for copyright protection, the long
tradition of judges modestly noting their inability to distinguished works of
genius from dreck, and the First Amendment difficulties of balancing
copyright principles and free speech rights in a copyright infringement
proceeding.165 The protection of obscene works was consistent with the
copyright and patent clauses' language and within Congress’s power to
protect.
After determining the statutory and constitutional lawfulness of
protecting obscenity under copyright law, the Mitchell Bros. Film Group
Court subsequently discussed the arguments for defending obscene works in
a court of equity, as equity would protect any copyright owner.166

161

Tarbox, 486 F.2d at 1090 (footnote omitted).
See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979);
See also Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1982).
163 Mitchell Bros. Film Group, 604 F.2d at 854.
164 Id. at 854.
165 Interestingly, the Mitchell Bros. Film Group court did not discuss that fact that the
copyright act was amended several times during the era of copyright morality without
Congress expressly accepting or reject copyright morality resulted in a legislative acquiesce
through inaction to the status quo.
166 Mitchell Bros. Film Group, 604 F.2d at 854-861.
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First, the Mitchell Bros. Film Group court rejected the line of cases that
considered judges the custodian of public morality. The court held that “it is
evident to us that it is inappropriate for a court, in the absence of some
guidance or authorization from the legislature, to interpose its moral views
between an author and his willing audience.”167
Second, the Court in Mitchell Bros. Film Group summarily rejected the
judicial doctrine that a person can have no property right in illegal works by
citing the U.S. Supreme Court case of Board of Trade v. Christie Grain &
Stock, Co.—a trade secret case.168 Trade secrets are readily distinguishable
from copyright. Trade secret law is historically a matter of state common law
or statutory law. Consequently, it is unclear whether, without substantive
analysis, a court may import state tort law principles into rights created by
Congress under an express grant of the constitutional power in which
Congress provided for a remedy in equity. Because trade secret law’s
relevance in this context is unclear, the cited case law underlying this point
is infirm.169
Third, the Mitchell Bros. Film Group Court addressed the doctrine of
unclean hands. The court rejected the unclean hands doctrine because it
permitted a court to create a defense not authorized by Congress. 170
Disingenuously, the court conflated a remedy at law with an equitable
remedy. If Congress allows a remedy in equity, then that equitable remedy,
unless Congress provides otherwise, is subject to all the rules and maxims of
equity remedies. The court held that “If the copyright holder cannot obtain
financial protection for his work because of actual or possible judicial
objections to the subject matter, the pro-creativity purpose of the copyright
laws will be undercut.”171 Arguendo, if this statement by the court is true, it
merely becomes a factor to be weighed in balancing the equities instead of a
dispositive factor to preclude consideration of equitable principles as a
defense in copyright infringement cases.172
The Mitchell Bros. Film Group Court also considered whether
limitations on equity would frustrate congressional purposes. The court did
not have to make a nuanced balancing of the interests of the copyright owner
167

Id. at 861.
Id.
169 Cf. Sony Corp. of America v. University City Studios, Inc., 464 US 417, 440 & n. 19
(1984) (exercising caution to bring patent principles into copyright law and rejecting a kinship
between copyright and trademark law). A careful Sony suggests that there may be an abyss
between copyright law and trade secret law.
170
Mitchell Brothers Film Group, 604 F.2d at 861-862.
171 Id. at 861.
172 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392-393 (2006).
168
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vs. the public because the lower court denied any remedy in equity to the
copyright owner.
The Mitchell Bros. Film Group Court also never opined why it decided
that Congress intended the 1909 Copyright Act to displace sub silentio the
traditional doctrines, rules of equity, principles such as the doctrine of
unclean hands.173 A cannon of judicial interpretation is that, when Congress
does not speak on a topic when it amends or enacts new legislation,
“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial
interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a
statute without change.”174 Hence, the burden was on the Mitchell Bros. Film
Group court to demonstrate that it was not Congress’s intention to maintain
the status quo of prior courts denying registration, protection, or remedies to
obscene works.175
Whether the Mitchell Bros. Film Group court’s analysis would survive
more recent U.S. Supreme Court cases is unclear, such as eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C. in which the Court held that “a major departure from
the long tradition of equity practice should not be lightly implied” in patent
cases and copyright cases.176
Fourth, the Mitchell Brothers Film Group court held as a matter of
judicial convenience and economy that adjudicating obscenity during each
ordinary copyright infringement case (or copyright registration case) would
inject an unmanageable element into a run of the mill copyright infringement
actions.177 Even today, there are only a handful of copyright infringement
cases involving works that are arguably obscene or immoral. This argument
173

Mitchell Bros. Film Group, 604 F.2d at 861. One leading commentator wrote that the
Library of Congress and the Copyright Office floated draft bills in 1905 and 1906 that would
have “denied copyright to ‘any profane, indecent, immoral, or scandalous production, oral or
written”; William F. Patry, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, VOL. 2 §3:43 (2019). However, it does not
seem that these drafts were ever considered by Congress. So, there is language in the
legislative history that was either ignored or uncited by the Mitchell Bros. Film Group court
to support its position.
174. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978); see also SHAMBIE SINGER & NORMAN J.
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.09 & cases cited
therein; but see Star Athletica, LLC. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1002, 1015 (2017).
175 Noting that, since the Mitchell Bros. Film Group Court’s opinion pre-dated the 1976
Copyright Act, one may argue that there still should be no change in the presumption that
obscene works are not eligible for protection or remedy under the Copyright Act.
176 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (citation omitted); See also
MercExchange, 547 U.S. at 394-395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). The Court in MercExchange
cited numerous copyright cases in support of its holding. One leading commentator opines
that the MercExchange Court’s holding may not apply to trademark injunctions; See J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:47.70.
177 Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 1979).
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against federal courts litigating these issues assumes(creates?) a slippery
slope into the abyss of additional work for federal judges. Again, assumption
without citation to precedent, legislative history, or statistics. Federal
obscenity cases are relatively rare. One may assume that obscenity cases that
raise copyright issues would be even a smaller subset of a negligible part of
the federal court docket.
Finally, the Mitchell Bros. Film Group court considered, even if
obscenity was an affirmative defense, whether granting an equitable remedy
would be proper in these types of cases.178 To raise the defense of unclean
hands, the party asserting the defense may show that unclean hands injured
them. However, the defense of unclean hands is not a moral search warrant
for judges to look for inequitable behavior outside the litigation. 179 In the
case of an obscene work, the work’s immorality does not change the relative
status between the copyright owner and the infringer. The infringer may have
even dirtier hands because while they are both distributing pornography, the
infringer is also infringing another’s copyright. The Mitchell Bros. Film
Group Court also rejected the public injury argument as a ground to invoke
the unclean hands doctrine.180 They concluded equitable remedies may be
appropriate but only if it furthered the purposes and policies underlying the
copyright act.181 However, the Mitchell Brothers Film Group court is not
clear on why the public policy factor of the multi-factor balancing test would
not encompass this injury to society at large.182 The author concedes that he
may be conflating separate strands of legal analysis.
Because the Ninth Circuit in Jartech, Inc. adopted the Mitchell Brothers
Film Group court’s analysis without engaging in an independent substantive
analysis, it merely extended the holding of Mitchell Brothers Film Group to
apply to the newly enacted 1976 Copyright Act, and further discussion of
Jartech, Inc. would be superfluous.183
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Id. at 861.
Id. at 863-864.
180 Id. at 863-864 nn.24-25.
181 Id. at 865.
182 Id. at 863 (The Court seemed to dismiss this possibility of public policy with “obscenity is
not an appropriate defense in an infringement action, whether piggy backed on unclean hands
or introduced in some other manner.”).
183 See Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1982); See also Ann Bartow,
Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright 2.0, 10 VAN. J. OF ENT & TECH. L. 799, 832 (2008)
(“Jartech court observed that ‘Nimmer . . . considers Mitchell Brothers to represent the
prevailing view on this issue,’ and apparently outsourced its analytical thinking about the
topic to a copyright treatise.” internal citations omitted).
179
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iv. Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video
While commentators and scholars accepted Mitchel Brothers Film
Group as an authoritative rejection of over a century of case law, lower
courts outside the Fifth Circuit have found it less persuasive.184 Devils Films,
Inc. v. Nectar Video rejected the holdings in Mitchel Brothers Film Group
and Jartech.185 The Devil Films, Inc. court was presented in a petition for a
preliminary injunction on the question of whether a court should “commit
the resources of the United States Marshal’s Service to support the operation
of the plaintiff’s pornography business.”186 The court did not have to decide
independently whether obscenity was a defense to copyright infringement.187
This case is unique because there was already a finding that the infringed
copyrighted content was also legally obscene.188 Therefore, two of the policy
arguments underlying the Mitchell Brother’s Film Group analysis were
irrelevant:189 (1) the fear that adjudicating obscenity would inhibit protected
speech and (2) that it “introduce[s] an unmanageable array of issues into the
routine copyright infringement actions.”190 Obscenity is not protected under
the First Amendment, and the question of obscenity was essential to the
underlying litigation.191

See Jartech, 666 F.2d at 406 (“The leading treatise on copyright has called [the Mitchell
Brothers] case “the most thoughtful and comprehensive analysis of the issue.’ . . . Nimmer
also considers Mitchell Brothers to represent the prevailing view on this issue.” internal
citations omitted); Patry on Copyright § 3.22, Goldstein on Copyright § 2.51; Nimmer on
Copyright § 2.17.
185 Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); See also
Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. Swarm Sharing Hash File, 821 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447 n.2 (D.
Mass 2011) (“Notably, it is a matter of first impression in the First Circuit, and indeed is
unsettled in many circuits, whether pornography is in fact entitled to protection against
copyright infringement.”).
186 Devils Films, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 175.
187 Id. at 176.
188 Compare Devils Films, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 175 with Nova Prod. Inc. v. Kisma Video,
Inc., 2004 WL 2754685 at *3, Not Reported in F. Supp. 2d (S.D.NY. 2004) (obscenity is a
question of fact and declining to decide it on summary judgment).
189 Devils Films, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 175.
190 See Mitchell Bros. Film Group, 604 F.2d at 863. This fear of opening the floodgates to
unmanageable copyright litigation asserting an obscenity defense seems to be irrational when
one considers how rarely these issues are raised in copyright cases either before or after
Mitchell Brother’s Film Group. For example, there are 1,457 federal cases on Westlaw using
the search term (obscene!). There are 10 cases using the search in the synopsis and digest
fields (obscene! /s copyright). Both searches were run in “federal cases” on November 7,
2020.
191 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
184
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The Devils Films, Inc. court’s nuanced analysis of a federal court’s
judicial powers and their limitations under principles of equity, as it carefully
weighed public policy prohibiting the dissemination of obscenity, especially
with the aid of the court, with the statutory rights of the copyright owner,
And, the Court found under these specific facts that the Congress was
unlikely to have intended the protection of copyright law to extend to
contraband and to use the office of the United States Marshalls to aid in the
violation of state and federal law.192 Whether a copyright owner can suffer
irreparable harm or even actual damages for the reproduction of an illegal
work to reproduce or to disseminate is unclear unless it extends the
infringer’s profits.193 However, the copyright’s statutory damage provisions
may still have applicability in similar cases.
B. COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION AND COPYRIGHT IMMORALITY
Because of the Copyright Office’s registration function as a precedent to
infringement litigation, potentially, the morality of a copyrighted work is
reviewed not only by the courts but also by an administrative agency before
a copyright infringement suit.194the administrative history of obscenity and
copyright registration demonstrates numerous confounding factors which
make it difficult to discern any lessons. The Comstock Act prohibited
sending sexually suggestive material through the mail and medical and
scientific information relating to sexuality, for example, publications relating
to birth control or abortion. Because it was illegal to send obscene material
through the mail (Comstock Act), it is unlikely that any rational author would
pursue copyright registration and risk fine or imprisonment. This observation
is not a speculative “it is possible that” contention because at least the
example one individual attempting to register a work who had his home
raided by the police.”195 It was of no avail that the individual submitted the
work to the Register of Copyright without using the post office services.196
One may assume that only the most innocuous and banal of sexually
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Devils Films, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 176; even the Nimmer Treatise acknowledges that
while illegality may not be considered as an element of copyrightability, it may be considered
as factor in determining damages. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.04[C][3][b].
193 Cf. MercExchange, 547 U.S. at 391-392.
194 See 17 U.S.C. §411(c); see also Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation v. WallStreet.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 887 (2016).
195 See William F. Patry, 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §3:44 (2019).
196 Id.
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suggestive works or the most prudish medical textbooks were sent by mail
to the Copyright Office for registration197
Eventually, the Register of Copyright wrote that “There seems to be
plenty of authority for the proposition that a work which is obscene on the
whole and which is published for an obscene purpose is not copyrightable.
On the other hand, it seems equally clear that the fact that a book may contain
obscene passages does not mean that it is not copyrightable.”198 This
sometimes led to the Copyright office’s spectacle granting copyright to work
deemed unmailable by the United States Post Office.199 To avoid this shame,
the Library of Congress asked Congress to provide criminal penalties for
registering (or attempting to register) obscene, seditious, or blasphemous
material.200
As judicial standards for what constitutes obscenity became stricter, the
Library of Congress sought the Attorney General’s opinion on whether it had
the power to reject copyright registration for obscene works.201 The Attorney
General concluded that the Register of Copyright’s right to refuse copyright
registration is unclear, but he declined to find Register was without this
power.202 However, the Attorney General noted the difficulties of exercising
this power to review works pending copyright registration under morality
principles by the Register of Copyright. It seems that it was the expedient
policy of both the Attorney General and the Copyright Office to register
these works, and challenges to the copyrightability of the work “should be
raised if at all, as equitable defenses in infringement suites where a court can
consider all of the circumstances and not as an outright bar to registration.”203
The current policy is to register the work without examining whether the
work is obscene or illegal, with a narrow limitation on works that may
contain child pornography. In child pornography cases, the Copyright Office
will forward the work and the application to the Department of Justice.204

See Id. During this time the Copyright Office’s Revisory Board considered suggestively
obscene or scandalous works such as a song containing the lyric that “Santa has cotton balls
and a candy cane” and a traditional Dutch Holiday Scene.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id. “The Librarian of Congress was interested in works that were seditious, libelous,
obscene, or other matter that would either be illegal or opposed to public policy.”
201
Id.
202 PATRY, supra note 195.
203 Id.
204 Id.
197
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i. Patent
As in the case of copyright law, the Copyright and Patent Clause of the
U.S. Constitution was read by the early courts to include morality as an
element of patent protection eligibility. Congress enacted the 1836 Patent
Act and used the term useful without any definition of the word useful. It
then allowed the courts to decide what was legally useful in the context of
patent protection eligibility.205 In Lowell v. Lewis, Justice Story articulated
the requirements that useful patented inventions were not “injurious to the
well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society,” for example, “a new
invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private
assassination.”206 Eight years later, Justice Story tempered his opinion in
Earle v. Sawyer. In Sawyer, the Court held the invention “must not be
[solely] noxious or mischievous, but capable of being applied to good
purposes; and perhaps it may also be a just interpretation of the law, that
[useful] meant to exclude things absolutely frivolous and foolish.”207
While the technical legal history of moral utility is nuanced, the treatises
and courts quickly grafted into the case law a general obligation of moral
utility whose tentacles extended well beyond patent law in the legal
imagination.
The most recent cases (post-1952 Patent Act) recognize that the Patent
Act had never displaced or supplemented the states’ general police power,
and Congress may, if it chooses, declare some subject matter unpatentable.208
An invention may be noxious in one context and salubrious in another. The
difference between poison and medicine is purely one of intent and not of
effect.209 Neither equity nor Congress has delegated the role of morality
205

See Application of Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 178-79 (CCPA 1960) (quoting WILLARD
PHILLIPS ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS (American Stationers Co., Boston, 1837)
“The requisite of usefulness has been sometimes contrasted with frivolousness, and the
multiplicity of patents for trivial subjects has been occasionally deprecated by judges. An
invention may be slight and trivial as being so obvious and apparent that it cannot be
considered a discovery, or it may be trivial or frivolous in respect to its effect upon industry
and production. A defect in the first sense renders the patent void as being for a subject that
is not an invention. But an invention of a very slender character in the latter sense is still the
subject of a patent, since it is not the province of the court to go into the question of the extent
or degree of usefulness. It is enough that the invention is useful; how useful it may be is
immaterial.’”) This quotation suggests that the limitation of useful in the patent act was not a
moral distinction but a limitation more analogous to the modern doctrine of non-obviousness.
206 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).
207 Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254, 256 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825).
208
See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999); See also
Application of Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383, 1395 n. 12 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
209 See Cooley v. Granholm, 291 F.3d 880, 882 (6th Cir. 2002).
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police to the USPTO. Today usefulness under patent law is a question of
functionality and not use-based morality.
Surprisingly, the doctrine of moral utility was rarely raised in published
cases as an equitable defense in cases not challenging the patent’s validity.
The immorality of the invention seems to be an inchoate defense to an
equitable remedy. In cases questioning the availability of an equitable
remedy, courts have rejected the general societal morality of the patent, the
patent owner, or the infringer in determining the availability of an equitable
remedy.210 For example, in Mills v. Industry Novelty Co., the court rejected
a defense in equity that the patented invention was used for the purpose of
facilitating gambling, which was illegal at that time in most of the United
States.211 The court held that “Clearly an unlawful use of a device made by
its patentee can be given no license to the general public to infringe the patent
by the construction of a device which is used in legitimate trade.”212 Relying
on a prior case involving the same or a similar device, the Court applied the
equity’s maxim that equity follows the law.213 Through the patent act,
Congress had granted the patentee the right to exclude others from practicing
the invention. And in determining legal rights, equity follows the law. “And
if a legal right is established beyond every defense, legal or equitable,
available to the defendant or to the court on its own motion, equity must grant
appropriate relief if there is no adequate remedy at law. Injunction, it is
evident, is the only means equal to enforcing the right to exclude.”214
The case law relied upon by the Berger court, and implicitly by the
Industry Novelty Co. court, were cases involving whether a patentee had to
practice or to license the invention before seeking an equitable remedy.
These cases are distinguishable from disputes where the question before a
court of equity is the claimed invention’s morality and enforcing the
patentee’s rights in equity. Judge Grosscup wrote in a powerful and
persuasive dissent in Berger:
The issuance of the writ, upon the case presented, will involve
the court as an abettor in practices universally denounced and
legislated against as harmful to the public morals. It will be an
injunction in aid of crime. When the patentee comes into court
210

The author was only able to find two cases, and both are roughly contemporaneous, very
old, involve gambling devices and a counterfeit coin detector, and are from the same circuit.
211 Mills v. Industry Novelty Co., 230 F. 463, 463-64 (N.D. Ill. 1916).
212
Mills v. Industry Novelty Co., 230 F. 463, 464 (N.D. Ill. 1916); but see Fuller v. Berger,
120 F. 274, 280 (7th Cir. 1903) (Grosscup, J., dissenting).
213 Fuller, 120 F. at 279.
214 Id. (emphasis added)
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with some conscionable use for his invention, or even with a nonuse divorced from unconscionable use, it will be time to consider
his claim for a writ; until that time, he should be shown the
chancellor’s back.
On the point of whether equity affords a remedy in patent infringement
cases where the invention violates morality and a well-established strong
uniform public policy, there is at best weak case law. Nevertheless, the rare
cases granting an equitable remedy explicitly first found that there was no
adequate remedy at law, a prerequisite for equitable relief, and none of these
cases found a need for an expansive equitable remedy.
ii. Trade Secret
Although trade secret law sounds in equity,215 there does not seem to be
a similar robust (or any) black letter law strain of morality running through
the modern history of trade secret law nor is trade secret law underpinned by
explicit principles of commercial morality except for the weighing of the
morality of its alleged misappropriation.216 The modern law of trade secret
was first coherently articulated in 1868 by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Peabody v. Norfolk.217 In 1905, in Board of Trade v.
Christie Grain & Stock, Co., the U.S. Supreme Court rejected morality as an
element of trade secret protection.218 The Court held that “[i]f, then, the
plaintiff’s collection of information is otherwise entitled to protection, it does
not cease to be so, even if it is information concerning illegal acts. The
statistics of crime are property to the same extent as any other statistic, [sic]
even if collected by a criminal who furnishes some of the data.”219 The court
here explicitly granted trade secret protection to data comprising illegal acts
gathered by a criminal whose immoral acts generated some of the illicit data.
Dirtier hands are hard to imagine.
There appears to be only one arguably more modern case on point (at
least in dicta) that focused on a trade secret claimant’s morality. The court in
Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson opines that “Protection of trade secrets is an
equitable doctrine. Secrets obtained by wrongful means are not entitled to
215

WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5642 (1st ed.).
Cf. Peter S. Menell, Tailoring A Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105
CAL. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2017).
217 Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868); see Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret
Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL L. REV. 241, 252-253 (1998).
218 Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock, Co., 198 U.S. 236, 251 (1905).
219 Id. at 251.
216
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protection, and the ‘unclean hands’ doctrine may apply . . .”220 So, at least
one case makes it clear that the misappropriator of trade secrets will find no
refuge in a court of equity when its stolen secrets are stolen from the thief.
Nevertheless, Hudson is not inconsistent with Christie Grain. The
Hudson court focused on illicit obtaining the trade secret, not on the trade
secret's legality. The modern history of trade secret law seemingly focuses
on whether the information was a commercial secret or the morality or
immorality of the person obtaining or disclosing the trade secret rather than
on the morality or legality of the content being revealed.221 For example, a
list of potential fencers of stolen goods was held to be a trade secret.222
Therefore, a merchant was accused of selling stolen merchandise and was
able to protect the sources of the alleged stolen goods as a trade secret. The
court did not address a property interest morality in a list of entities
potentially fencing stolen goods. Instead, the court focused solely on whether
the party asserting the trade secret met their burden of proving that the
information was secret and had some economic value without considering
whether, as a matter of public policy, there should be a property interest in
the information itself.223 One may speculate that in an especially egregious
case—perhaps misappropriating an already misappropriated trade secret
(stealing from a thief) or if some strong public policy commanded it, the
creation, retention, or possession of the underlying trade secret itself could
be sufficient to constitute an unclean hands defense.224
The limitations on the scope of trade secret protection arise at the
affirmative defense stage of the litigation when the alleged misappropriator
asserts that the disclosure was privileged.225 Much of the modern analysis of
trade secret law focuses on carving out public policy exceptions for
whistleblowers or testimonial privileges rather than the underlying question
of whether the information that constituted the alleged trade secret was either
220

Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 1295-96 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing 2 Callman,
UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES §53.2(a)) (3d ed. 1968).
221 See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Nabisco Brands Inc., 111 FRD 326, 331 (D. Del. 1986)
(ignoring the surreptitious manner surrounds the trade secret collection of information and
focusing on whether the claimed information met the legal definition of a trade secret).
222 Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 171 Cal. App. 4th 1, 7 (2009),
disapproved on other grounds Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.2d 877, 894 (Cal.
2011).
223 Costco, 171 Cal. App. 4th at 13-14.
224 See 4 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 16.01 (2020) (“Often defendants thrash about and
make broad essentially ad hominem allegations about plaintiff. These will not suffice to create
an unclean hands defense. The unclean hands has to be in some way directly or at least
rationally related to the subject matter of the litigation.”).
225 See Wright, et al., 26 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 5644 (1st ed.)
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legal or moral and the correlative questions of whether rights in illicit
information should be recognized as property or protected. These cases often
start with information that may constitute evidence of a crime, assume that
it is protected information if it meets the other elements of trade secret law
(regardless in the licit or illicit nature of the secret itself), and then shift the
burden to the whistleblower or discloser to demonstrate as an affirmative
defense that there is a privilege that protects the disclosure. As the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition opines “A privilege [to disclose]
is likely to be recognized, for example, in connection with the disclosure of
information that is relevant to public health or safety, or the commission of
a crime or tort, or to other matters of substantial public concern.”226
Consequently, trade secret law is moot on injunctive relief based on the illicit
nature of the information constituting the trade secret.
iii. Trademarks
The disparaging, scandalous, and immoral clauses of § 2(a) of the
Lanham Act served a similar function to moral utility limitations on
patentability or the common law of copyright morality. Section 2(a) as well
as § 2(a)-(b) of the Model State Trademark Bill kept the courts from having
to enforce some marks which, like some inventions, violated well established
public policies.227 The prohibition on federal or state registration these marks
served to insulate trademark law morality from judicial scrutiny in equity.
Unlike the laws governing other forms of intellectual property, § 2(a)
codified a form of statutory morality into the trademark law. The historic ban
on registering immoral, scandalous, or immoral marks makes finding
relevant case law outside the context of challenges to registering a mark a bit
more onerous.
Under the common law of trademarks, to be a trademark, the chosen
designation could not “transgress[] the rules of morality and public
policy.”228 As the author of a leading trademark law treatise of the 19 th
century wrote: “[t]he moral, religious, or political sensibilities of any people
must not be shocked by the perversion of an emblem sacred in their eyes.”229
226

THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40, cmt c.
See In re Tam, 785 F.3d. 567, 576-577 rehearing on banc granted opinion vacated 600 Fed.
Appx 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015); MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22:5.
228 See Cohn v. People, 149 Ill. 486, 493 (1894); Hetterman v. Powers, 43 SW 180, 182 (Ky
App. 1897).
229
WILLIAM HENRY BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKS AND ANALOGOUS
SUBJECT 608 (Little Brown & Co. 1873). Interestingly, Browne also wrote without any
citation to cases or examples that “we must not blindly follow the loose, random sayings of
227
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There are some common law trademark cases in which the court very briefly
considered morality.230 So, one may conclude that courts have the equitable
power to consider the mark’s nature in whether to grant an equitable remedy,
but they have never been called upon to do so. At best, the history of
trademark law in the 19th and 20th centuries focused on the morality of the
mark in creating trademark rights themselves rather than in the morality of
the trademark's enforcement.

V. CLEAN HANDS AND DIRTY MARKS
The application of prudential limitations inherent in a court’s equity
jurisdiction governing the enforcement of disparaging, immoral, scandalous,
or immoral (profane) marks was not an issue until the courts decided Tam.
Before Tam, the USPTO had the obligation not to register profane marks.
And, when the USPTO failed in its gatekeeping function, the newly
registered marks were either likely to be (administratively or judicially)
canceled or unlikely to be so extreme as to warrant a court denying the mark
owner an equitable remedy. The marks that escaped the USTPO’s scrutiny
were generally disparaging marks or puerilely scandalous marks. In the case
of disparaging marks or scandalous marks, the litigation’s focus was either
the registration of the mark or the cancelation of the registration, not the
scope of enforcing the mark.231 Courts will now squarely face with the
question of whether despite registration, a mark may be so repugnant to
principles of equity or public policy that a court may decline to exercise its
equitable powers to provide a remedy for trademark infringement or whether
the discretion that equity grants the court suggests or compels a narrow
remedy.

judges, that any emblem may be lawfully employed for this purpose.” Accordingly, one may
infer that there was some tension in the state of the law at that time.
230 See Ellis v. J.H. Zeillin & Co., 42 Ga. 91, 92-93 (1871).
231 The persistent attempts to cancel the Washington Redskins marks are a good example of
targeting a trademark registration for cancelation. The REDSKINS, WASHINGTON
REDSKINS, and the REDSKINETTES marks were litigated, cancelled, appealed, reversed,
affirmed, remanded, vacated, and relitigated before the USTPO and in the federal courts
between 1994 and 2018; See e.g. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828 (TTAB
1994) and Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 709 Fed. Appx. 182, 182 (4th Cir. 2018) (vacating
an appeal in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Tam) with numerous cases in between.
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A. FIGHTING WORDS OR WORDS THAT YOU C ANNOT SAY ON
TELEVISION
Unlike the USPTO, which has been successfully drawing lines in the
language of commerce through its ex parte grant or denial of trademark
registrations under §2(a); courts have engaged in a nuanced analysis of
words and their legal and social impact on a fully developed and litigated
record in the context of broadcasting, fighting words, and most recently
infringement by trademark dilution. Unlike the USPTO, federal courts may
consider broader public policies and the first amendment in adjudicating
disputes.232 Further, in addition to the fighting words line of cases, there is a
well-developed body of case law regarding profane words that may not be
used or only used with limitations by broadcast television. There remains a
robust doctrine of trademark dilution by tarnishment, which protects famous
trademarks from disparagement (tarnishment). The obvious argument
against this article’s proposal that a court to deny or limit equitable remedies
in cases involving profane marks is one of definition and precision.
Concededly, a robust multi-factor description of pernicious profane marks,
much less a bright-line test, is impossible. However, mere imprecision of
language standing alone does not render an argument unsound as
administrative agencies and courts have been drawing these lines in other
sensitive first amendment contexts.
i. Fighting Words (or Hate Speech)
There is a long line of U.S. Supreme Court cases that recognize that some
speech in the context of fighting words, defamation, and obscenity may “be
regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content False”233
Early U.S. Supreme Court decisions such as Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
which held that:
Allowing the broadest scope to the First Amendment's
language and purpose, it is well understood that the right of free
speech is always not absolute and under all circumstances. There
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited speech-classes, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to

232

See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975); Petruska v. Gannon University, 462
F.3d 294, 308 (3d Cir. 2006); Apple, Inc. v. Smartflash, LLC, 2016 WL 3035587 at 13 (PTAB
2016) (citing cases).
233 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992).
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raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’
words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. ‘Resort to
epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the
Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no
question under that instrument.’234
Under this long but early line of cases, the solution of limiting protection
to marks that constitute fighting words would barely raise a colorable first
amendment argument. 235
However, more recent fighting words (or hate speech) cases, such as
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn, have gradually expanded first amendment
protection to words and phrases that would have been fighting words under
Chaplinsky.236 Although RAV sounds in Chaplinsky, for example, in R.A.V.,
the Court observed that “From 1791 to the present, however, our society, like
other free but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content
of speech in a few limited areas, which are ‘of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’”237
Today, the standard is that fighting words or hate speech may be
regulated speech based on their listeners' effects. These words may not be
regulated based on the content of fighting words or hate speech.238 Speech
may be limited if the regulation serves a constitutional purpose without
considering the content of the speech.239 A broad fighting word prohibition
is permissible because that would focus on the speech as an act provoking

234

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (citations omitted).
is unnecessary to demonstrate that the appellations ‘damn racketeer’
and ‘damn Fascist’” are fighting words.).
236 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (rejecting the opportunity to modify
the scope of the Chaplinksy formulation as overbroad).
237
Id. at 382-83 (citing a long line of Supreme Court cases).
238 Id. at 383-84, 391 (limiting “fighting words [to words] that insult, or provoke violence, on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.” impermissible” internal quotation omitted).
239 Id. at 389.
235 Id. at 569 (“Argument
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violence. Still, a ban on insulting words that target identifiable groups would
be an unconstitutional government attempt to regulate content.240
First Amendment jurisprudence has evolved since the 1940s. Courts
have been able to navigate these legal shoals with some limited success in at
least in the context of fighting words (hate speech).241 The line between
trademarks that should be unenforceable as a matter of public policy or
unenforceable as a matter of traditional equity principles is not a fixed bright
line. The line will move in many dimensions—often simultaneously: social
dimensions based on social, group, and even individual norms; temporal
dimensions: as time passes, society and individuals change as well as the
contemporary understanding of the meaning of a term; and another,
dimension: the intent of the trademark owner. So, like much of trademark,
the law courts and the public will have to accept likelihoods and probabilities
rather than fixed points if courts accept this article’s contentions.
The time, place, manner, the speaker, and other aspects of context all
influence how “speech” is understood and the legal consequences of the
speech.242 So, the use of the designation SLANTS, as measured immediately
post-WWII and post-Japanese American internment camps, could be
understood quite differently as measured in 2018.243 The use of the
designation SLANTS by a group that wants to return to an anti-immigration
policy is different from using the designation SLANTS by an AsianAmerican singing group that intends to transvalue the negative meaning of
the SLATS by adopting it as a trademark.244

240

Id. at 390-91.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942); but see source cited
supra note 191 (requiring the hate-speech prohibition be viewpoint neutral).
242 See, e.g. Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 136-37 (D. Mass. 2004) (false statement
that heterosexual plaintiff was homosexual is no longer slander per se). Trademark has always
analyzed a mark in the context of the marketplace, consumer attitudes, and contemporary
morals and mores; See e.g. AutoZone v. Strick, 543 F.3d 923, 930 (7th Cir. 2008) (this is an
analogous concept to that of a transformational use under copyright law which is more highly
valued and protected than a mere mindless unoriginal copying); In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330,
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2017), aff’d on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2204 (2018).
243 See Matal v. Tam, 137 U.S. 1744, 1751 (2017) (“‘Slants’ is a derogatory term for persons
of Asian descent”).
244 Id. at 1751; See generally cite literature to reclamation; see also Adam M. Croom, The
Semitics of slurs: A Refutation of Coreferenetialism, 2 AMPERSAND 30, 32-33 (2015) (slurs
and derogatory terms are not the same as descriptors); Jean-Marc Dewaele, “CUNT”: On the
Perception and Handling of Verbal Dynamite by L1 and LX Users of English, 37
MULTILINGUA J. OF CROSS-CULTURAL AND INTERLANGUAGE COMMUNICATION 53, 78 (“the
word “cunt” uttered by a woman to a man removes the misogynistic connotation of the word,
making it slightly less offensive.”).
241
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B. PROFANE WORDS ON BROADCAST TELEVISION OR RADIO
This section will discuss the jurisprudence of profane words whose use
is limited by the Federal Communications Commission. The purpose of this
discussion is not primarily to prove the constitutionality of the proposed
solution (although it supports it); but rather the goal is to demonstrate the
competency of the courts (or an administrative agency) to implement the
solution by differentiating among the offense levels of marks, and to apply
differing public policies that apply differing levels of protection to some
forms of profane speech. There are words that one cannot say on broadcast
television.245 Comedian George Carlin made a career out of the seven words
that one can never say on off-the-air broadcast television.246 The U.S.
Supreme Court in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation found that Congress could
authorize the FCC to channel obscene, indecent, or profane terms into
temporal or spatial zones that would minimize a consumer of broadcast
television or radio to be exposed these offensive terms.247 The Pacifica Court
recognized the danger of self-censorship by on-air broadcast media and
opined that:
It is true that the Commission’s order may lead some
broadcasters to censor themselves. At most, however, the
Commission’s definition of indecency will deter only the
broadcasting of patently offensive references to excretory and
sexual organs and activities. While some of these references may
be protected, they surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment
concern.248 [The Court noted in the footnote to this quote that] A
requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its
primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be
expressed using less offensive language.249

See 18 U.S.C. §1464 (prohibiting “any obscene, indecent or profane language by means of
radio communication” and prescribing a term of imprisonment and fine); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999
(2018) (prohibiting indecent material on broadcast television between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.).
246 Seven Dirty Words, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_dirty_words (last
updated October 8, 2020.) (according to Carlin they are shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker,
motherfucker, and tits); See generally FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-749
(1978) (The text of Carlin’s act is reproduced at pages 751-755).
247 Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 750.
248 Id. at 743 (internal footnote omitted).
249 Id. at 743 n.18.
245
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This statement of First Amendment principles applies with equal or
greater force in the context of profane marks and commercial speech.
C. TRADEMARK DILUTION BY TARNISHMENT
Assuming arguendo that trademark dilution by tarnishment survives
post-Tam as being viewpoint-neutral, trademark tarnishment law may be
useful by analogy.250 Federal trademark dilution law protects famous
trademarks from dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment.251 A
famous trademark is one that is generally known among the consuming
public of the United States.252 “‘[D]ilution by tarnishment’ is [an] association
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark
that harms the reputation of the famous mark.”253 A famous mark is tarnished
when it is associated with inferior goods or if the association lessens the
famous mark’s capacity to serve as a wholesome identifier.254 So, students of
trademark law learn to their amazement that associating Victoria’s Secret, a
store that sells women’s lingerie and similar sexualized products, with sexrelated products from a much smaller retailer was likely to tarnish Victoria’s
Secrets famous brand.255 Courts are readily able to determine when a brand
is disparaged. Even when the likelihood of disparagement or tarnishment of
the famous brand border on the inane and is based on readily distinguishable
case law, courts are prepared to protect the famous mark. Courts could make
similar determinations when the disparagement or tarnishment of a mark is
not an economically valuable mark but relates to disparaging an individual
or group identity’s core principles.
D. FLATTENING THE SLIPPERY SLOPE
Concededly, the contention of this article that courts should use their
equitable powers to enforce in equity some marks more rigorously and other
marks perhaps not at all based on the nature of the mark, and even more
specifically consider the social impact of the mark owner starts with one foot
250

See First Amendment—Freedom of Speech—Trademarks—Matal v. Tam, 131 HARV. L.
REV 243, 252 (2017); Ramsey, supra note 85, at 456.
251 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION §3:34 (5th ed. 2020).
252 See id. § 1125(c)(1); Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 105106 (2d Cir. 2009).
253
Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
254 Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996).
255 See V. Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Mosely, 605 F.3d 383, 387-388 (6th Cir. 2010).
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on a proverbial banana peel. And the other poised to take a step down a
slippery slope to unconstitutionality—especially a strict application of
concepts of such as vagueness in first amendment jurisprudence. As was
discussed previously, there are at least four-justices of the Court prepared to
accept that some class of marks will fall under a narrow definition of
scandalous (but not disparaging) for if Congress is regulating for viewpointneutral reasons, may be constitutionally denied federal trademark protection.
And, under its Commerce Clause powers, Congress could remove state or
common law protection from the profane marks.
As inculcated into modern first amendment jurisprudence, the double
effect doctrine provides as elegant, if narrow path, to leveling the fictitious
slippery slope.256 Legislatures and judges may not inhibit speech because
they disagree with the expressed viewpoint. The fixed star in first
amendment jurisprudence is content neutrality in enacting laws affecting
speech. Still, speech may be restricted because of the harmful societal effects
of the message—if the social impact independent of speech is the lawful
subject of government regulation.257
Cases, such as R.A.V. v. The City of St Paul, illustrate that some forms
of speech may be regulated because of their constitutionally prescribed
content. However, the viewpoint expressed using that content may not be
suppressed.258 Indeed, even the general bar against viewpoint preference or
suppression is not absolute when the regulated speech falls within the ambit
of so-called proscribable speech.259 In R.A.V., the Court justified this
departure from First Amendment norms stating that words that fall within
the proscribable speech rubric play no essential role in expressing ideas. 260
Additionally, narrow limitations on profane speech remedies present a
negligible risk of driving perspectives out of the marketplace of ideas.261 The
Court further found that “when the basis of the content discrimination
consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is
proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination
exists.”262 Viewpoint discrimination is a danger in the case of disparaging
See Edward C. Lyons, In Incognito —The Principle of Double Effect In American
Constitutional Law, 57 FLA. L. REV. 469, 529-535 (2005).
257 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992).
258 See id. at 385; see also id. at 383 (giving examples such as obscenity, defamation, and
fighting words).
259 Id. at 387.
260 Id. at 385.
261
Id. at 387-88; see IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“lewd, obscene, profane, libelous, and fighting words to be categories of speech wholly
outside the protections of the First Amendment”).
262 Id. at 388.
256
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marks. As previously discussed, it is a minimal risk in the case of scandalous
marks as they are defined in this article.263 So profane marks begin the
analysis with a diminished zone of constitutional protection.
Under the First Amendment, the zone of protection for profane marks
narrows because they are usually “associated with secondary effects of the
speech so that the regulation of the speech is justified without reference to
the content of the speech.”264 As an example of constitutional government
regulation of free speech, the Court in R.A.V. provided that “sexually
derogatory fighting words,” may be regulated if they result in a violation of
Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination of employment on the basis of
sex.265 The government’s interest in limiting this type of speech is not to
prohibit the prejudicial message but rather to safeguard those who may be
negatively impacted by this speech, whether in the workplace or society.
Although there is sufficient evidence to support the legislative finding that
profane marks can cause societal harm analogous to the injuries cited as
examples in R.A.V. and Congress, courts have relied on content-neutral
justifications discouraging particular speech even if an outright ban on
trademark registration is impermissible.266
i. Equity and Trademark Law
Trademarks are a property right, but of a strange sort.267 The
fundamental property right of a trademark owner is the limited right to
exclude others from using the mark in a manner that is likely to cause
consumer confusion.268 Except in the case of famous trademarks, all other
uses of marks by others are permissible.269 As a matter of black letter law, an
owner is entitled to damages as a matter of right to compensation for tortious
injuries caused to the property. However, equitable remedies are a matter of
judicial discretion and not a matter of right.270 The most significant
263

See supra Section II.

264 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505

U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
265 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
266 See supra Section II.
267 See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus, Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918); See also J.
Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §2:10
(describing the nature of a property right in a trademark). Because of the unique nature of the
limited ownership right in a trademark owner is often called a “trademark holder.”
268 McCarthy, supra note 220.
269
Id.
270 See, e.g. MercExchange, 547 U.S. at 391; Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never
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distinctions between law and equity are the election of remedies. A court of
law may award monetary damages while a court of equity may order an
injunction or decree instructing a party (or even a third-party) to act or to
forbear from acting.
Furthermore, a court of equity will not order an equitable remedy unless
the party can show no other adequate remedies at law available to them (e.g.,
damages are insufficient to remedy the injury).271 Generally, in copyright and
patent infringement cases, courts of equity limit remedies where the subject
matter of the protected intellectual property is injurious to public morals,
illegal, or otherwise contrary to public policy. 272 More recently, case law and
commentators have rejected or criticized this approach for numerous
reasons, the most significant being that this exercise of equitable discretion
does not have a statutory basis.273
In contrast to the other intellectual property law remedies,274 all
trademark infringement dispute remedies are guided by equity principles.275
There is a sound statutory basis for distinguishing trademark remedies from
other intellectual property remedies where the courts had read into the
copyright or patent act limitations that were not clearly expressed in the
statute. Section 35 of the Lanham Act expressly provides that:
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the
Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under section 1125(a) or (d) of this
title, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this title,. . . the plaintiff
shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of sections 1111 and 1114 of this
title, and subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant’s profits,
(2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.276
The phrase “subject to the principles of equity” was added at the last moment
most likely to put a limit on awards of profits as damages in trademark
infringement litigation without an intention by Congress for more significant
equitable doctrine based limitations on at law remedies such as damages.277
awarded as a matter of right.”).
271 See International Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1084
(7th Cir. 1988); Mark A. Thurmon, Ending the Seventh Amendment Confusion: A Critical
Analysis of The Right to A Jury Trial in Trademark Cases, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 53
(2002).
272 See supra Section I.
273 Id.
274 Compare 17 USC § 504 (copyright), 35 U.S.C. § 284 (patent), and Uniform Trade Secrets
Act § 3, with 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (power of the courts to award damages in trademark cases).
275
15 U.S.C. §1117(a); see Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1495 (11th Cir.
1983).
276 15 U.S.C. §1117 (emphasis supplied).
277 See also Thurmon, supra note 271, at 307-308 (2010) (suggesting that this historical

138

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 12:2

Consequently, the limitations on equitable remedies suggested in the article
may not for policy reasons affect the amount of damages that the alleged
infringer should pay.
As this article contends, rarely is there a public interest in the dissipation
of profane marks. Interestingly, damages are usually a matter of law, and
adequate damages may preclude an equitable remedy.278 Here, Congress
made even a damage award that is subject to the principles of equity.279 The
court has discretion in determining damages. Making damages subject to
equitable principles and enhanced judicial discretion suggests that a
trademark infringement court sitting as a court of equity should exercise
sound discretion in granting or issuing an injunction or crafting the scope of
the injunctive relief.
ii. Powers of Courts of Equity
The court of equity’s ultimate power is to close the door—for the
chancellor to turn her back on the petitioner.280 Every law student can recite
by rote the maxim of equity. “[S]he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands.”281 One other maxim is relevant here. “Equity follows the
law.”282 This section analyzes whether an equitable principle is sufficiently
nuanced to reach the solution proposed by this article that courts sitting in
equity jurisdiction use equitable principles to deny or limit equitable relief
to profane marks.
The most important this context is equity follows the law “aequitas
sequitur legem”.283 A court sitting in equity jurisdiction cannot do what the
law forbids.284 However, the Supreme Court in Holland v. Florida stated:
change permitted court’s sitting in equity to award damages).
278 See International Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1084
(7th Cir. 1988).
279 See, e.g. General Electric Co. v. Speicher, 877 F.2d 531, 535 (7t`h Cir. 1989); Louis
Vuitton SA v. Lee, 875 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 1989); See also John Edward McCarthy,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (WestLaw) (5th ed. 2020).
280 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. et al. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S.
806, 814 (1945).
281 Id.
282 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (Sweet and Maxwell., 3d ed.
1920). Also relevant is “equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy.”; See Browing
v. Peyton, 918 F.2d 1516, 1521 (11th Cir. 1990); M.B. Angell, The Principles of Equity, 29
HARV. L. REV. 888, 889 (1916) (discussing the equity maxim). As was discussed supra, the
proposal of this article does not leave trademark owners remedy-less.
283
But see Equity Contra Legem.
284 SEC v. Stanford International Bank, Ltd., 927 F.3d 830, 842-843 (9th Cir. 2019); See also
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, 575 U.S. 320, 327-328 (2015).
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We have said that courts of equity “must be governed
by rules and precedents no less than the courts of law.” But
we have also made clear that often the “exercise of a court's
equity powers ... must be made on a case-by-case basis.” In
emphasizing the need for “flexibility,” for avoiding
“mechanical rules,” we have followed a tradition in which
courts of equity have sought to “relieve hardships which,
from time to time, arise from a hard and fast adherence” to
more absolute legal rules, which, if strictly applied, threaten
the “evils of archaic rigidity,” The “flexibility” inherent in
“equitable procedure” enables courts “to meet new
situations [that] demand equitable intervention, and to
accord all the relief necessary to correct ... particular
injustices.” Taken together, these cases recognize that courts
of equity can and do draw upon decisions made in other
similar cases for guidance. Such courts exercise judgment in
light of prior precedent, but with awareness of the fact that
specific circumstances, often hard to predict in advance,
could warrant special treatment in an appropriate case.285
This article does not recommend that lower courts ignore either law or
precedent but rather recognize that profane marks are a special case that
courts have not considered before Tam and Brunetti and use their just
discretion. Courts should distinguish prior precedent and give appropriate
weight in all profane mark cases to the public interest factor before granting
an equity remedy in crafting one.
a. Standards for Equitable Relief
Equitable remedies are sought as a matter of course by litigants and
seemingly granted or entered by judges as a matter of routine, so it is useful
to begin this section with a reminder. An equitable remedy is an
extraordinary remedy, and it is not a remedy that is granted as a matter of
right.286 Instead, an equitable remedy is vested in the sound discretion of the
court.287 Older cases refer to the discretion in equity as an exercise of

285

Holland v. Fl, 560 U.S. 631, 649-650 (2010)(internal citations omitted).
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-312 (1982).
287 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
286
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discretion as the chancellor's conscience.288 Regardless, “courts of equity
must be governed by rules and precedents no less than the courts of law.”289
So, before granting an equity remedy, there must be an affirmative finding
that the existing remedies available at law are insufficient.290 An adequate
remedy at law is a plain, adequate, and complete remedy; and, an adequate
remedy at law divests a court of equity of its jurisdiction.291 There may be
close cases on the question of whether a remedy at law is adequate; however,
because of the inherent nature of profane marks as expressive terms and their
pervasiveness in society, and the purposes of equitable relief in trademark
infringement actions, monetary damages should be sufficient in most cases.
In Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, the court held that where the plaintiff
and defendant present competing claims of injury, the traditional function of
equity has been to arrive at a “nice adjustment and reconciliation” between
the competing claims[.]. In such cases, the court “balances the conveniences
of the parties and possible injuries to them according as they may be affected
by the granting or withholding of the injunction.” “The essence of equity
jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mold
each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than
rigidity has distinguished it.” 292
To make this decision, the court must engage in an individualized, caseby-case determination applying all the factors articulated in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C.293 “A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a
See H. Jefferson Powell, “Cardozo’s Foot”: The Chancellor’s Conscience and
Constructive Trusts, 56 DUKE L&CP 7, 27 (1993) (discussing the concepts of equity and
justice in society today).
289 Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996).
290 See Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 845 (9th Cir. 2020) (“must establish
that [plaintiff] lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past
harm . . .). See Mort v. United States, 86 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 1996) (“It is a basic doctrine
of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act ... when the moving party has
an adequate remedy at law.” (ellipsis in original) (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381(1992))); see also e.g. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S.
60, 75–76 (1992) (holding that when “remedies are equitable in nature ... it is axiomatic that
a court should determine the adequacy of a remedy in law before resorting
to equitable relief”); Schroeder v. United States, 569 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir.
2009) (“[E]quitable relief is not appropriate where an adequate remedy exists at law.”).
291 See James Buchwalter and John Kimpflen, What Constiutes and Adeuate Rmedy at Law,
23 CJS EQUITY § 23 (2020) (citing Georgia RR & Bank Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952)).
292 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312-313 (1982).
293 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
288
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remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that a permanent injunction would not
disserve the public interest.”294 The court must weigh each of these factors
before granting an injunction. This article will not address the first three
factors because, as was discussed previously, the author contends that
profane marks are inherently weak marks.295 Profane marks are likely to be
at best weakly descriptive marks or a form of trade dress requiring proof of
secondary meaning. There will be strong trademark fair use justifications for
competitors (and others) to use these marks and defenses aesthetic
functionality. Ubiquitous exposure in numerous contexts so that one more
use is unlikely to cause irreparable harm. Considering these competing uses
and the mark’s weakness, monetary damages paid by a competitor-infringer
is likely to be an adequate remedy at law. This article is agnostic on
balancing the hardships. Still, it concedes between the trademark registrant
and the infringer in most cases, the balance should tip in favor of the
registrant. However, injunctive relief is a four-factor test and not a fourelement test, so no one factor is dispositive in all cases—finally, the fourth
factor, the factor of the public interest. As was and will be discussed, the
public interest (“public policy”) and intellectual property seem to have a
meandering role in modern equity practice.296
b. Public Policy and Equity in Intellectual Property
One could with a high degree of confidence say that discouraging
“immorality” broadly defined to cover deception, lewdness, or other acts
detrimental to social morality and public policy was both in the public
interest and consistent public policy when a court sat in its equity jurisdiction
for most of U.S. history.297 Over time, courts abandoned this role in the
context of intellectual property disputes because of the complexity of the
issues, a sustained doubt as to their institutional competency, and a desire to
contract the court’s docket. This section briefly will develop the modern
doctrine of public policy and injunctions and return to issues first mentioned
earlier regarding Mitchell Brothers Film Group, but left until now for
development.
Public policy is a formal recognition of the public interest as articulated
by Congress, administrative agencies, and the courts. However, the court’s
evaluation of the public interest factor when determining to enter an
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Id.
See supra Section II.
296 See supra Section IV.
297 See supra Section V.
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injunction often gets short shrift by the courts as the court’s attention weighs
more on the first three factors. This prioritization is reasonable (but bad
jurisprudence) because the parties before the court are focused on the first
three factors and their significance to the actual dispute. The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that in exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity
should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the
extraordinary remedy of injunction. Thus, the Court has noted that “[t]he
award of an interlocutory injunction by courts of equity has never been
regarded as strictly a matter of right, even though irreparable injury may
otherwise result to the plaintiff[.]”298

VI. BALANCING EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES WITH PUBLIC POLICY
A significant factor used by courts in weighing the balance of the
equities is often not given enough weight by the courts—the public interest.
In this context, injunctive remedies, the public interests are often a proxy for
public policy. Courts have looked to the constitution, statutes, administrative
regulations, court decisions, including the common law, and even canons of
professional ethics to find relevant public policy sources. Whether the courts
can use public policy articulated in §2(a) of the Lanham Act that survived
Tam and Brunetti as a strong justification to limit the scope of an equitable
remedy in the case of profane marks is a challenging question. Superficially,
Mitchell. Brothers, Inc. presents the most persuasive arguments articulated
so far by a court against the use of equity to limit remedies based on “moral
grounds.”299 As discussed previously, the Mitchell Brothers, Inc. court
clearly articulated several good reasons why a court should not consider the
product's morality rather than the parties’ morality in evaluating a petition
for an equitable remedy. However, that was a copyright case, and trademark
law is readily distinguishable. The Mitchell Brothers Court in rejecting the
holding of Stone & McCarrick held that it “does not only apply a traditional
equitable doctrine; it goes further and extends the doctrine of unclean hands
to a situation not covered by the doctrine at common law and thus subverts
a statutory purpose.”300 In the case of profane marks, limitations on equitable
remedies would not frustrate other statutory purposes or clear congressional
intent.
A court in a trademark infringement case need not worry whether
Congress intended the remedies to be duplicative of or separate from other
298

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982).
Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 864 (5th Cir. 1979).
300 Id.
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laws with differing incentives—at least as far as profane marks are
concerned. Unlike in the case of copyright law where there are at least two
bodies of the relevant law, the copyright act, which promotes creativity and
the dissemination of works, and the laws governing obscenity, which
prohibit their creation and distribution which run (at least according to the
Mitchell Brother’s Film Group Court) on separate, but parallel tracks. Under
Mitchell Brothers Film Group, the author of the work had a federal copyright
incentive to create, register, and exploit the work. Still, if the author does so,
and the work is later deemed obscene by a court, the author may face fines,
imprisonment, or both (under federal and state law). The Mitchell Brothers
Film Group court thought it unfair to subject the author to a threat of no
copyright registration or protection in works with pushed moral boundaries.
While the author faced more severe penalties if the work was legally
obscene. Trademark law is largely unitary. Congress has expressed one set
of purposes and one set of policies governing trademarks embodied in the
Lanham Trademark Act (as amended), unlike in the case of copyright law
and obscenity.301
Congress did not intend for scandalous or profane marks to be federally
registered trademarks.302 To the degree that trademark registration and its
accompanying rights and remedies constitute a subsidy, Congress did not
desire to provide a subvention. There are no contrary federal or state policies
that would promote the use of profane marks.303 As was discussed above,
other bodies of law discourage their use. Consequently, the only declared
congressional trademark policy is to prevent the use of profane marks.
However, while there is a clearly stated policy, the mechanism designed by
Congress to implement this policy, the sections of § 2(a) prohibiting the
registration of profane marks have been declared unconstitutional.
Therefore, the hard question is whether the courts may use a constitutionally
sound policy (at least as to the problem scandalous marks) to justify the
application of equity when the specific means enacted by Congress are
unconstitutional as written and Congress fails to amend the statute.304
301 There seems to be no other body federal of law that provides any incentive to create profane

marks. In fact other bodies of law, such as those administered by the FCC would discourage
their use during certain hours and broadcast mediums. See https://time.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/12/da-14-1867a1.pdf. (While the FCC refused to punish a radio station
for using the disparaging REDSKINS mark on the air, the FCC did leave open the possibility
of sanctioning marks that were sexual or excretory in nature or hate speech once a competent
court makes that determination.).
302
15 USC § 1052(a) (2012).
303 Cf. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2311 (2019) (providing examples where indecent
or profane terms may not be lawfully used).
304 See supra Section III.
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However, its use as a public policy justification to deny an equitable remedy
or narrow the scope of such as remedy appears permissible and within the
court’s discretion when weighing equitable factors.

CONCLUSION
There are several possible solutions to rid the trademark registers of the
most indecent, vulgar, offensive, or profane of marks and perhaps
incidentally reducing their ubiquitous (and inescapable) presence in modern
society. Solutions range from—a careful application of neutral trademark
registration principles—to a highly limited and viewpoint-neutral
amendment of § 2(a) to eliminate scandalous marks—to a shift in the
analytical focus from registering the mark to the enforcement/remedy stage
of litigation. This article contends that all of these options would be
undertaken to minimize these marks’ social and economic harms in the best
of all possible worlds. Unfortunately, this is not the best of all possible
worlds; therefore, a focus on eliminating or narrowing equitable remedies
may be the more efficient and realistic in removing some of the statutory
trademark incentives supporting profane marks. For almost two hundred
years, courts have found that intellectual property rights sound in morality
and equity principles. Courts have not rejected morality as a basis for
intellectual property. Instead, they doubted their competence to be moral
arbitrators in an increasingly complex society. Equity still rests on a moral
foundation. The protections or remedies equity giveth, equity may taketh
away or narrow. As a matter of constitutional law, profane marks are
registerable today only because Congress declared a public policy then
artfully designed an unconstitutional mechanism to enforce that policy—and
then failed to act to correct the situation.
The Lanham Trademark Act §2(a), as eviscerated by the Court in Tam
and Brunetti, now permits individuals to register these marks. Still, neither
the constitution nor the Lanham Act may require that courts of equity protect
these marks by granting their owners a robust, comprehensive, equitable
remedy for trademark infringement. Little can be done to discourage
registrations for which the mark’s vulgarity constitutes the product other
than to consider under traditional trademark principles that recognize that
these marks are not product packaging but product design and protect them
under-trademark law. The changes proposed in this article are modest. Many
marks that are run-of-the-mill potty mouth offensive but are not legally
profane marks will escape the analysis offered in this article and receive
robust, equitable protection. In sum, for trademark registrants who want to
build a national brand, limitations on equitable remedies may provide a
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solution that will keep the most disparaging, obscene, vulgar, and profane
marks from becoming ubiquitous as trademarks for national brands. Still, it
will do little to discourage marks where the brand’s profanity is also its
commercial product.
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